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CONVERGENCE VERSUS DIVERGENCE, GLOBAL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AT THE CROSSROADS: GOVERNANCE NORMS,
CAPITAL MARKETS & OECD PRINCIPLES FOR CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
JanisSarrat
There is growing debate as to whether
international corporate governance
practices can or should converge.
Effective corporategovernancehas been
linked to the ability of corporationsto
compete in global capital markets.
Corporations operating in diverse
economies have capital structures that
are the result of public and private
choices, and the corporategovernance
issues that arisereflect these structures.
Thereis marketpressureforconvergence
of corporate governance norms. The
OECD hasformulatedPrinciplesaimed
at setting standardsfor corporationsas
they seek to attract capital. While the
shareholder protections proposed are
helpful in articulatingnorms that will
attractlong-term investment capital,the
Principlesfailtofully appreciatesomeof
the currenttensions between shareholder
rights and obligations of corporate
officers. Moreover,while the Principles
suggest that corporationscomply with
laws regarding obligations to
stakeholders, they fail to adequately
discuss why shareholder rights are
elevated to a universal norm, whereas
accountabilityto otherpartiesimplicated
in the corporation,such as creditorsand
workers, is not.

La possibilitj et la pertinence d'une
convergence despratiquesen matijrede la
rdgie des entreprises internationalesfont
l'objet d'un dibat croissant. La gestion
efficace est relijeaupouvoirconcurrentiel
des entreprisessur le marchimondial des
capitaux.Les entreprisesopdrantdans des
milieux jconomiques divers ont des
structures financijres qui risultent des
choix des secteurs public et privd, et le
style de gouvernement reflte ces
structures.Despressions s 'exercent sur le
marchdpourune normalisationde la rigie
des entreprises. L'OCDE a formulg des
Principesen ce sens pour les entreprises
qui cherchent b attirerdes capitaux.Bien
que les protectionsprivues h 1'jgarddes
actionnaires soient utiles pour
l'ilaboration de normes favorisant
l'investissementde capitaux &long terme,
les Principesne prennent paspleinement
en ligne de compte certaines des tensions
actuelles entre les droits des actionnaires
et les obligations des dirigeants
d'entreprises. De plus, bien que les
Principessuggirent aux entreprises de se
conformer auxlois ddictantles obligations
envers les actionnaires, ils n'expliquent
pas clairement pourquoi les droits des
actionnaires sont Rlevis au rang d'une
norme universelle, alors que la
responsabilitj envers les autres parties
participantb une entreprise,parexemple
les criancierset les employis, ne le sont
pas.

t Professor of corporate law and insolvency, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. My
thanks to Paule Stewart, law student UBC Faculty of Law, for her research assistance, and to R.
B. Davis of the Ontario Bar for his helpful comments on a draft of this paper. Any errors are my
own.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Effective corporate governance has become a key consideration with the
growth of global capital markets. Corporations must enhance their governance systems
if international capital is to invest in their enterprises, particularly corporations in those
jurisdictions with developing or transitional economies. There is, however, considerable
debate as to whether there is a convergence of corporate governance principles and
practice as corporations compete in global capital, labour and products markets, and
whether such convergence should be a policy objective.
This article discusses two aspects of this debate. First, it explores whether such
a convergence is likely to occur either through regulatory change or by operation of
private law. The debate regarding optimal corporate governance principles, when
applied to diverse capital structures implicated in international corporate activity, is at
a nascent stage. The debate is accompanied by private law and capital market pressure
for convergence. It is far from clear that "efficiency" in corporate governance can be
achieved through unquestioning reproduction of the Anglo-American governance model
throughout the world. The Anglo-American model and its various features were a
response to highly diversified ownership and the correspondingly strong role of
managers in governance, giving rise to agency theory. Other market economies, such
as Japan and Germany, have different capital and governance structures, and are
informed by different normative notions of efficiency.While some convergence is
occurring due to market pressure, there is also countervailing pressure from the diverse
economic, social and political systems in which corporations operate.
Second, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) has sought to articulate global corporate governance principles. While the
principles are an important contribution to the governance debate, shareholder rights are
underdeveloped as a normative principle, particularly as they are applied to bank-centred
economies and more generally, in respect of principles enhancing shareholder activism.
This article also suggests that notwithstanding the existence of successful models of
corporate governance that incorporate other investors in the firm, such as workers and
creditors, the discourse has been dominated by a shareholder rights paradigm. While
enhanced shareholder rights are an important aspect of international governance
regimes, the narrow focus of the debate fails to fully explore other key capital structures
and their resultant governance models. The OECD Principles give only a cursory nod
to this set of issues, and as a result, the principles are helpful but not fully developed.
Part I very briefly introduces the OECD Principles as background to the
discussion that follows on approaches to corporate governance in diverse economies.
It then briefly examines theoretical approaches to governance, including AngloAmerican notions of efficiency. Part II analyses the link between capital markets and
effective corporate governance. Part III describes corporate governance schemes in
different economic systems and discusses how the symptoms of ineffective corporate
governance manifest themselves in each. This discussion assumes that effective
corporate governance is represented by the market-centred and bank-centred models that
dominate internationally. A discussion as to whether these models represent an optimal
economic model is beyond the scope of this paper. Part IV describes the market
pressure for convergence of corporate governance practices, suggesting that governance

Ottawa Law Review /Revue de droit d'Ottawa

[Vol 33:1

practice has converged to some extent where corporations are seeking capital in AngloAmerican securities markets. Part V then suggests that the OECD Principles make a
positive contribution to the governance debate. However, based on the discussion
earlier in the paper, it offers a critique of those aspects of shareholder rights and
stakeholder protection that are absent, arguing that such considerations should be part
of any further development of universal norms. Part VI concludes that the diversity of
capital and corporate structures does not preclude a convergence of principles that
would enhance corporate governance and ultimately access to global capital markets.
However, it requires a willingness to move beyond Anglo-American governance norms
to explore the benefits and risks of other governance structures.
A.

OECD Principlesfor CorporateGovernance - A BriefIntroduction

In 1999, the OECD developed non-binding Principles for Corporate
Governance (the Principles).' Application of the Principles could arguably enhance the
protection of equity investors, allow for equitable treatment of minority and foreign
shareholders, and facilitate the movement of capital internationally. The Principles are
ostensibly aimed at recognizing the different legal regimes that corporations operate
under globally and at assisting governments in their efforts to improve the regulatory
framework for corporate governance. They focus primarily on publicly traded
corporations, but also apply to privately held and state-owned enterprises. The Principles
are discussed at length in Part V. However, it is helpful to note here, for purposes of the
discussion that follows, that they are organized around four key principles: shareholder
rights and equitable treatment of shareholders, disclosure and transparency to enhance
accountability, the role of other stakeholders, and the responsibility of corporate boards.
The OECD Principles recommend that the corporate governance framework
should provide basic shareholder protections regarding transfer of shares, ensure timely
and accurate disclosure on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the
financial situation and operating results, corporate objectives, performance, ownership
structure and voting rights, membership of the board, key executives and their
remuneration, governance structure and policies of the corporation. The Principles
suggest that the corporate governance framework should "recognize the rights of
stakeholders as established by law" and encourage active co-operation between
corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of
financially sound enterprises. They recommend that boards should fulfil key functions
such as reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, risk policy, annual budgets and
business plans. The corporate board should also set performance objectives, monitor
corporate and managerial performance, oversee major capital expenditures, and engage
in strategic planning. These are, at first glance, all intuitively appealing principles.
Transparency, basic protection of property rights, effective boards and stakeholder

The OECD is a multilateral organization with 29 member countries and numerous
non-member countries who "share the common values of pluralistic democracy and market
economy." OECD, Ad Hock Task Force on Corporate Governance, OECD Principlesfor
Corporate Governance, Doe. No. OCDE/SG/CG(99)5 (April 1999), online: OECD
<http://www.oed.orglpdf/M000080OO/MO0008299.pdf> (last modified: May 1999) [hereinafter
Principles].
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collaboration are key to attracting capital and generating wealth. However, as the
discussion that follows indicates, they are thin on their analysis when applied to diverse
economic systems and their capital and governance structures. They are essentially a
reproduction of Anglo-American governance norms with only very cursory
acknowledgement of both the challenges and benefits of other governance structures.
B.

TheoreticalApproaches to Governance

Corporate governance includes both the internal governance mechanisms ofthe
corporation and the broader public regulatory framework in which corporations operate.
It is a set of legal tensions and relationships, and the structure by which corporate
decisions are made such that capital can be raised at a cost-effective price, assets utilized
in efficient generation of wealth, and corporate officers are held accountable to those
investing in the frm.2 While a distinction can be drawn between public regulatory law
and the private governance activities internal to the corporation, internal governance is
itself a function of both private decisions regarding optimal management of the
corporation, as well as public law notions of director and officer responsibilities. Both
are aimed at ensuring the efficient operation of the corporation and the generation of
economic activity while reducing agency costs. Debate regarding optimal corporate
governance structures has centred around two broad theoretical approaches that can be
loosely classified as contractarian and communitarian, although there is a broad range
of views among these theorists.
The contractarian approach to corporate governance suggests that contracts are
the mechanism by which stakeholders, those having both implicit and explicit contracts
with the corporation and its managers, exercise control over managers in order to protect
their interests.' The dominant normative paradigm for contractarian scholarship is that
the only residual claimants (afterpayment of all debts) to the firm's assets are the equity
capital investors, based on long-standing and powerful notions of property rights that
inform most of private law.4 The goals that flow from these notions are shareholder
wealth maximization, aimed at an optimal return on investment of equity capital. Thus,
much of this scholarship focuses on why it is efficient to have corporate officers
accountable primarily or solely to shareholders and why shareholders are the parties
with the greatest incentive to monitor.' Agency theory seeks to reduce inefficiency in
the nexus of contractual relations' structure of the firn, by advocating structural

2 G. Visentini, "Compatability and Competition between European and American
Corporate Governance: Which Model of Capitalism?" (1998) 33 Brook. J. Int'l L. 833 at 835; F.
Barca, "Alternative Models of Control: Efficiency, Accessibility and Market Failures" in
J.E.Roemer, ed., PropertyRelations,Incentives and Welfare (London: MacMillan Press, 1997)
at 195.
3 M.C. Jensen & W.H. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure" (1976) 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 at 305-315 [hereinafter "Theory ofthe
Firm"].
' J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000).
1 F.H. Easterbrook & D. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 36-3 8.
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measures and incentives that align the interests of corporate directors and officers with
those of shareholders. 6 Agency theory distinguishes between decision rights on business
decisions exercised by managers; monitoring and ratification/reward rights given to
directors; and default control, fundamental change decision rights and monitoring rights
given to shareholders.7
Shareholders, particularly minority shareholders and
shareholders in widely held corporations, suffer from information asymmetries, freerider problems, lack of incentives to invest in the acquisition of expertise and the costs
of monitoring, in part due to the limited liability regime. Efficient governance
mechanisms include the co-location of decision making power, incentives and specific
knowledge to make effective decisions, while creating incentives to monitor and hence
reduce agency costs.8
However, the contractarian model poses difficulties as a complete answer to
corporate governance. There is no consensus on whether shareholder wealth
maximization is short or long-term, and there continues to be high transaction costs
associated with this tension in terms of shareholder disputes and litigation. Control of
agency costs does not necessarily create accountability of managers to shareholders.
Contractarians have argued that market responses to poor governance i.e., exit and price
reductions, will ultimately result in replacement of managers or shifts in governance.
Yet exit by investors can send uncertain and untimely signals to managers through
imperfect markets.9
Contractarianism, based on the notion that redistribution constitutes
interference, does not acknowledge that current market models were based on a
particular distribution of property, and that the governance systems they generate have
redistributional effects that continue to shift value to property owners. A shareholder
wealth maximization paradigm thus has distributional consequences that are made
invisible using a purely contractarian analysis. Another operating assumption of
contractarians is that corporations are free to externalize numerous costs by having
others bear the costs of decisions that create production or market efficiencies for the
corporation, but may have negative economic and social consequences for the
environment and/or communities. The pressure to be globally competitive and resulting
secondary and contingent labour markets, "labour shedding," and the search for cheaper
labour markets are viewed as efficiency enhancing because the harm caused by these
structural changes does not have to be accounted for by the corporation. Yet the logic
of a contractarian approach should be to recognize, value and account for all implicit
and express contracts and thus for all costs associated with particular governance
decisions. If there is to be accurate accounting of such externalities, the question is why
those bearing the risk of loss and actual losses do not have their interests routinely
accounted for in corporate decision making. Yet for this approach, capital markets are
enhanced when public law facilitates liquid markets ratherthan imposing rigid standards
on corporate behaviour.

6
'

"Theory of the Firm", supra note 3.
E.F. Fama & M.C. Jensen, "Separation of Ownership and Control" (1983) 26 J. L. &

Econ. 301.
' "Theory of the Firm", supra note 3.
9 L.L. Dallas, "The Relational Board: Three Theories ofCorporate Boards of Directors"
(1996) 22 J. Corp. L. 1 at 42.
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A second theoretical approach is that of communitarian scholars who generally
suggest that corporate governance should be aimed at ensuring that the corporation as
a legal personality is a responsible member of society. In generating wealth, governance
should ensure that the corporation is accountable to the communities in which it
operates, and is advancing public policy in terms of investor protection, environmental
protection and employment standards. This scholarship views corporate governance as
the mechanism by which the corporation and its decision makers are held accountable
to all of the stakeholders of the corporation. The objective is still generally shareholder
wealth maximization, but tempered by an objective ofgood corporate citizenship." This
view reflects the notion that long-term shareholder wealth maximization creates stable
supply and consumer markets, lower turnover in employees, enhances productivity and
thus value of the corporation to its shareholders and to society. A challenge of the
model, however, is to develop an acceptable method to determine what are socially
optimal goals and to respond to the question ofwhy corporate officers are better situated
than public policy makers to determine what those goals are.
Lynne Dallas has responded to this problem by proposing relational corporate
boards situated within power coalition theory. This theory suggests that the corporation
is an institution whose activities result from a contest for control among power
coalitions of stakeholders: shareholders, creditors and employees." The behaviour of
the corporation is influenced by contracting, but also by formal and informal co-opting,
and the process of absorbing new elements into the decision- making structure of the
corporation, in order to avert threats to the stability of the firm. It focuses on three
spheres of accountability for ensuring that corporate officers act responsibly: voice or
exit, markets, and judicial intervention. 12 Dallas points to empirical data that suggests
that a corporate board representing diverse interests is an effective means of acquiring
resources, reducing environmental uncertainty, making optimal use of skills of diverse
participants, and ensuring that decision making takes account ofthe context in which the
corporation operates.
The gap between contractarians and communitarians reflects different
normative understandings and assumptions regarding the role of the corporation.
However, both theoretical approaches have made contributions to the governance
debate. The contractarian view allows for ease of accountability given that corporate
officers are accountable only to shareholders and given its single equity capital
maximizing objective. It does, however, have weaknesses in terms of discerning
shareholder wealth maximization given the diversity of investors and different risk
" M.A. O'Connor, "The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to
Facilitate Labour-Management Co-operation" (1993) 78 Comell L. Rev. at 958 [hereinafter
"Human Capital Era"]; L. E. Mitchell, "Co-operation and Constraint in the Modem Corporation:
An Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate Morality" (1995) 73 Tex. L. Rev. 477 at 501-2; M.
O'Connor, "Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty
to Protect Displaced Workers" (1991) 69 N.C.L. Rev. 1189 at 1195; D. Millan,
"Communitarianism in Corp orate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies" in L.E. Mitchell,
ed., ProgressiveCorporateLaw (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).
" L.L. Dallas, "Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means"
(1988) 22 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 19 at 85.
12 Ibid.
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capabilities and investment timelines. Moreover, the narrow focus of contractarian
theory results in the creation of externalities and an artificial distinction between costs
of firm activity that are accounted for within the corporation and those that are not. It
fails to acknowledge that the initial distribution of property, economic rights and
political rights then determines the scope of possible economic and political outcomes
when looking at market allocations of resources, goods and services."3 Market theory
fails to account for this initial distribution and its impact on cost/benefit analysis.
Communitarian theory may provide a more fulsome analysis of corporate transactions
in that it would account for the costs of corporate transactions that are considered
externalities under the contractarian model. However, its inability to articulate who
decides priorities, and on what basis, leaves the model highly vulnerable to corporate
decision making that is accountable to no one.
C.

Rethinking Efficiency and Governance

The dominant Anglo-American approaches to corporate governance explain
and reinforce a notion of maximization of share value as the singular and optimal goal
of corporate decision making. 4 According to this theoretical approach, any rights of
creditors or employees ought to be strictly limited to contractual and statutory rights. 5
These traditional views of corporate governance have been buttressed by statutory and
judicial support for the notion that the objective of the corporation is shareholder wealth
maximization, withjudicial deference to business judgements that accomplish that end. 6
Shareholder wealth maximization or the "shareholder primacy norm" had its origins in
cases involving disputes between minority and majority shareholders, prior to enactment
of oppression remedies, where the courts held that corporate officers were to act in the
best interests of all shareholders. 7 These cases did not address situations in which the
interests of other stakeholders were affected. Nevertheless, they were quickly embraced
as supporting shareholder primacy, to the exclusion of other interests in the firm.
Theory and practice thus converged to create and legitimize a narrowly cast view of
corporate governance that requires directors and officers to take account only of
shareholder interests.
Concepts ofproperty, maximization ofshareholder wealth, and efficiency goals
are deeply embedded normative concepts and are the underpinnings of current AngloAmerican theories of corporate governance. Yet their normative invisibility does not
render their normative content non-existent. Efficiency generally means the allocation
of financial and other corporate resources, to put assets to their highest use while
11 B.A. White, "Feminist Foundations for the Law of Business: One Law and
Economics Scholar's Survey and Re(view)" (1999) 10 UCLA Women's L. J. 39 at 42, 51, 74.
i" M. Kessel, "International Aspects of Corporate Governance, A United States
Perspective" (Canadian Bar Association Conference on Corporate Governance, Vancouver, 1997)
(Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1997) 1at 2.
"5J. Macey & G. Miller, "Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective" (1993)
43 U.T.L.J. 401 at 427.
16R.J. Daniels, "Must Boards Go Overboard? An Economic Analysis of the Effects of
Burgeoning Statutory Liability on the Role ofDirectors in Corporate Governance" (1995) 24 Can.
Bus. L.J. 229 at 231.
17 D.G. Smith, "The Shareholder Primacy Norm" (1998) 23 J. Corp. L. 277 at 279.
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controlling transaction costs. Hence legal rules should be constructed to ensure
resources are allocated to their optimal use, which will ultimately benefit society as a
whole because of the economic activity and wealth it will generate. 8 Optimal use,
however, is normatively defined as maximizing equity value. Although there are a
number of pricing mechanisms, efficiency is frequently measured by present share value
as the measure of shareholder confidence in managers and the market's overall
assessment of the governance of the corporation.' Failures in the market's ability to
accurately price are generally attributed to information asymmetries, the solution being
to create greater transparency in governance and corporate transactions in order for
investors to monitor and respond.
Creditors are assumed to have bargained a risk premium in the cost of credit.
However, this ignores the complexity and diversity of creditors. The more senior the
creditor, the more likely it is to have bargained a risk premium and secured its interest
against the assets of the corporation. Thus, while secured creditors will not benefit from
upside gains of a shareholder driven concept of efficiency, losses will have been
controlled. However, thousands of creditors are unsecured and unable to either
diversify risk or bargain a risk premium. They include small trade suppliers, repair
persons, employees, pension fund beneficiaries, local governments to whom payment
for taxes and utilities is owed, claimants harmed by environmental or consumer torts.
These creditors are considered fixed or contingent claimants, and thus corporate
decision making is not required to take account of their interests in maximizing value.
Thus efficiency, as currently normatively defined, allows for corporate decisions that
shift assets away from creditors, often expropriating value that could be used to satisfy
these claims, unless the shift is excessive enough to render the corporation insolvent.
The difficulty is that at this point, unsecured creditors are likely to receive no value or
only a severely discounted value for their claims, given the hierarchy of credit
realization in bankruptcy. Yet the decision making has occurred at a point very much
prior and these interests, which may be the most severely prejudiced by particular
corporate transactions, need not be accounted for in determinations of efficiency.
The discourse assumes as a normative starting point that the owners of capital
are free to externalize the costs of injury from their negligence or costs of adjustment
from restructuring. Efficiency, as it is currently understood, is measured by wealth
generation for the exclusive benefit of shareholders. Thus, it is almost always efficient
in the short term to seek out the lowest wages, engage in environmentally risky practices,
and to externalize adjustment costs. The current efficiency debate ignores the initial
distribution of wealth both domestically and internationally. Current markets do not
price the complex costs associated with production of a good, including environmental
harm, long-term sustainability and employment loss. These costs are externalized or not
costed at all.
Doug Kysar suggests that the current theoretical underpinnings of
macroeconomics developed when the world contained four billion fewer people and use

"8L. Kaplow &S. Shavell, "Should Legal Rules Favour the Poor? Clarifying the Role
of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income" (2000) 29 J. Legal Stud. 821.
'"E.F. Fama, "Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns and Behavioural Finance" (1998)
49 J. Fin. Econ. 283.
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of resources in productive activity and the waste produced were considered costless
because of the apparently limitless capacity to absorb both use and waste.20 He suggests
that GNP and GDP do not measure sustainable economic activity, quality of economic
growth, or economic growth as measured by its impact on particular countries. The
failure to integrate these notions often results in employment practices and
environmental issues being traded off from shareholder return, without a more fulsome
understanding of the objectives of efficient generation of economic activity.
Thus while few would take issue with the idea that resources should be utilized
optimally, how the objectives or benchmarks of optimal use are measured and defined
is key. Accuracy of costing may require tempering traditional efficiency measures to
encompass maximizing value by having regard to diverse investments in the firm.2 I This
expands the debate regarding objectives of short versus long-term shareholder wealth
maximization, to consider triple bottom lines including sustainability and recognition
of diverse inputs into productive activity. Rather than seeking the "most efficient"
course of action, traditionally normatively defined as shareholder wealth maximization,
corporate decision-making ought to encompass a choice between competing efficient
decisions, having regard to competing investor interests. This would lead to a more
even-handed approach both to efficiency and risk in terms of key stakeholders in the
firm. The starting point of measuring efficiency could be to consider what interests and
investments are at stake in the corporation, and to acknowledge that there are competing
efficient decisions. Such decision making could make Pareto improvements if costs are
fully accounted for, including those complex costs such as harm to long-term
sustainability and the social and economic costs of adjustments in employment markets.
In this sense, the model draws from the best attributes of contractarian and
communitarian theorists.
The debate regarding optimal governance norms becomes more immediate
when one considers the move to global capital markets and the need for governance
practices to become more transparent, more cross-border and cross-corporate culture in
their nature.
II. THE LINK BETWEEN CAPITAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Corporate governance is only one aspect of the larger framework of
macroeconomic policies, competition and tax policy, global capital, products and labour
markets, cultural norms and ethics, and diverse state regulatory systems. The growth of
global capital markets has created the potential for greater access to a larger investor
pool. Key to the attraction of long-term "patient capital," whether it is domestic or
international, is the ability to offer corporate governance systems that are clearly
articulated and adhered to, within regulatory and legal frameworks that support

D. Kysar, "Sustainability, Distribution and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law"
(April 2001) at 71, 73, 76 [unpublished, archived with author, cited with permission]. Kysar
suggests that a distinction must be made between accidental "environmental tragedies" and a
continuing pattern of externalizing costs that seriously undermines the potential for sustained
economic activity.
21 J. Sarra, "Corporate Governance Reform: Recognition of Workers' Equitable
Investments in the Firm" (1999) 32 Can. Bus. L.J. 384 at 386-392.
20
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contractual and ownership rights.' Articulation of these objectives by the OECD, as
will be evident in Part V, are the most valuable contribution that the OECD principles
make to the governance debate. However, with the emergence of global capital markets,
the governance debate continues to situate itself as a purely property based regime, with
private property viewed as a key means by which resources are used efficiently.
Discussion regarding global capital markets focuses on the need to protect those
property rights under vastly differing legal and political regimes, correlating shareholder
protection and developed external capital markets.' State regulatory systems that
protect private property rights are aimed at creating accountability to owners of capital
and to creating a "market" for efficient governance. Studies have indicated that there
is a direct relationship between effective corporate governance and investor confidence
in capital markets.24
Capital markets are key to economic development. Emerging or transitional
economies need foreign capital to make the investments necessary to generate wealth.
Developed market economies also require additional capital to meet product and other
market changes, and to ensure that they are globally competitive. However, the
globalization of capital markets should not assume that free markets will function
effectively absent an adequate regulatory and governance framework. The financial
market failures in Russia and Asia in the late 1990s are classic examples of this need.
The link between capital markets and corporate governance is important, but
is underdeveloped as a concept and thus does not reflect interests that are not defined
as traditional property rights. It simultaneously contains the language of free market,
while advocating state regulatory control to protect private property. The linkmanifests
itself in a variety of ways. For example, emerging and transitional economies are
frequently plagued by underdeveloped securities markets, inadequate regulatory
frameworks to recognize and protect investments, inadequate exit mechanisms, in some
cases corruption, and a judicial system unable to adequately respond to and provide
timely and effective remedies for these issues.25 However, even in developed market
economies, there have been some notable failures in the ability of shareholders, the
market or securities regulators to detect managerial misconduct.26 Depending on the

' I. Millstein, "Address" (Global Conference on Corporate Governance, Southern
Connecticut State University, 10 July 2000), online: Global Corporate Governance Forum
<http://www.gegf.orglibrary/steeches/Millstein7l0.doc> (date accessed: 23 October 2001);
Principles,supra note 1.
' R. LaPorta et aL, "Corporate Ownership Around the World" (1998), online: National
Bureau ofEconomic Research <httv:/netec.wst.edu/WoPEc/data/Paters/ nbrnberwo6625.html>
(last modified: 24 October 2001).
' See e.g. Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance in Canada,
Where Were the Directors?GuidelinesforImprovedCorporateGovernancein Canada(Toronto:
Toronto Stock Exchange, 1994).
' I. Millstein, "A Private Sector Perspective on Corporate Governance" (Latin
American Corporate Governance Roundtable, Sao Paulo, 26 April 2000) at 3, online: OECD
<http://www.oecd.org/ndf/M00015000/MO0015382.dt (last modified: 26 April 2000).
26 The RT Capital and Bre-X scandals in Canada are good examples of this. See e.g.Re
RT Management Capital Inc. et al. (20 July 2000), online: Ontario Securities Commission
<http://www.osc.gov.on.calenlEnforcementlDecisions/rtcapitaletal_20000720.html>
(last
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capital structures of these economies, controlling shareholders, corporate boards, banks
and other institutional lenders were thought to be carefully monitoring corporate
decision makers. The shift to global capital structures squarely raises the issue of
whether there should be a convergence in corporate governance norms such that
investors can appropriately assess where to invest capital and under what conditions.
It should be kept in mind that factors such as the legal and regulatory regime also
influence the ability of capital markets to act as an effective tool for channelling
investments efficiently.
A.

NationalHistoricalDevelopment andPublicRegulation of CorporateActivity

In most developed market economies, a public regulatory framework supports
and respects property ownership, shareholder rights, and other public policy standards
that create and delimit the role of the legal personality and its decision makers.
Governance is also affected by the existence or absence of numerous constraints on
corporate activity, such as controls on transfer or disposition of shares.27 Domestic laws
on accountability play a powerful role in the protection of investors. Corporate
governance is shaped by public laws that recognize, to varying degrees, the interests of
shareholders, creditors, workers and others in terms of director and officer liability for
contract enforcement, employment standards, gender and race discrimination laws, and
environmental protection. Public regulation to protect property rights is increasing
while there is simultaneously a move toward fewer standards regulating corporate
conduct in respect of environmental protections and employment standards. While
corporations and the economic systems in which they operate continue to diverge
internationally, some principles of corporate governance and the role of public
regulation may be slowly converging in order to facilitate cross-border economic activity
and to protect some key interests in the corporation.
Anglo-American capital markets have developed in a regulatory framework
aimed at protecting diverse equity investors. This "investor consumer" protection sets
standards for disclosure, creates regulated forums for securities transactions, imposes
prohibitions on insider trading, and creates other measures designed to facilitate access
to capital while affording basic protections to minority shareholders. The AngloAmerican system has also generated strong notions of fiduciary obligations of corporate
officers, now codified in statutes. The system has made public policy choices regarding
how the costs of corporate activity can be externalized, both in tax policy and in regard
to legislation as to who bears the costs of restructuring, downsizing and other corporate
transactions. Generally, other than limited notice, severance provisions and tax
remittance obligations of corporations, workers and communities bear the costs of
restructuring and the enormous human costs in terms of disruption to communities and

modified: 20 July 2000); J.G. Macintosh, "Lessons of Bre-X (?) Some Comments" (1999) 32
Can. Bus. L.J. 223; J.N. Gordon, "Pathways to Corporate Convergence? Two Steps on the Road
to Shareholder Capitalism in Germany" (1999) 5 Colum. J. Eur. L. 219 at 221.
27 M. Becht, "Strong Blockholders, Weak Owners and the Need for European
Mandatory Disclosure" (European Corporate Governance Network Executive Report, Bruxelles,
27 October 1997) at 35-36, online: European Corporate Governance Network
<http://www.ecgn.org/ecgn/docs/pdf/eu.pd> (last modified: 27 October 1997).
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loss of human capital investment. Yet, in addition to the wage/labour bargain contained
in economics literature, human capital should be broadly defmed to include worker
loyalty, foregone employment opportunities when younger, training and retraining costs
(both direct and opportunity costs), investment in the social and productive health of the
corporation, and decisions that have affected family life. These are costs and
contributions of workers not accounted for in assessing the effectiveness of public
regulation in creating efficient markets.
Once one moves beyond the Anglo-American corporate paradigm, the issues
differ somewhat. For example, some continental European countries, with different
historical development and civil law traditions, have frequently accorded greater
economic equality in the workplace. In part, this was facilitated by the bank-centred
capital structure and governance model that moved corporations away from a pure
shareholder wealth maximization norm. In contrast to the U.S., which used public laws
to severely restrict the activities of banks, banks in Germany and other continental
European economies were allowed to obtain ownership stakes and to offer securities
trading services to customers. This made the role of the bank as intermediary between
investors and the corporation key to governance structures. Public regulation thus
facilitated banks acting as direct equity owners, creditors and blockholders with a strong
governance role.2" These regulatory choices resulted in the underdevelopment of
securities markets, because capitalization did not require liquid securities markets and
oversight was exercised by banks and other blockholders performing a key governance
role. The monitoring role of banks also resulted in a model of corporate governance
with greater focus on the value of human capital contributions in addition to share
wealth maximization. Public regulatory choices have also been made in EU countries
in terms of the recognition of a role for employees in corporate governance, and the laws
regarding the cost of corporate activity that negatively impacts on employees and other
stakeholders. For example, the EU Acquired Rights Directive, adopted as legislation
in several EU member states, limits the ability of an acquiring bidder to lay off excess
employees in the immediate wake of a takeover.29 This protects employees and tempers
the takeover market in these economies.
As an example, German co-determination is a function of complex post-war
history regarding the appropriate role of corporation. In turn, these national historical
developments have tempered pressure to move to a purely shareholder wealth
maximization measurement of effective corporate governance, influenced also by
limited labour mobility and a resultant strong interest in governance by employees."0
Moreover, national wage adjustment programs, legislated co-determination structures,
national retraining programs and public policy that mandates the corporation to consider
workers' interests, shifts the governance focus and has resulted in a more comprehensive
means of addressing structural changes to corporations. With the high risk of
expropriation of their human capital investments removed, workers in turn developed

Visentini, supra note 2 at 849.
European Union Acquired Rights Directive,Eur. Rep. (9 January, 1999), online:
LEXIS (library.curnws).
30 L.A. Bebehuk &M.J. Roe, "A Theory ofPath Dependence in Corporate Ownership
and Governance" (1999) 52 Stan. L. Rev. 127.
28
29
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more co-operative production models, acquired higher firm loyalty, and interacted with
managers to create more productive work practices.
The link between capital markets and corporate governance has been described
as either path dependent or a function of markets. Some scholars have argued that
governance models are path dependent in that corporations reflect the historical, legal
and political frameworks in which they operate. Bebchuk and Roe observe, for
example, that the Anglo-American govemance norm is a function of path dependence
rather than a natural evolution towards efficiency, and that these norms have developed
in response to widely dispersed capital structures and protections and limits placed on
corporations under U.S. political and social institutions. 3 They suggest that there is
unlikely to be a convergence of corporate governance norms because of the strong
historical framework that operates to determine governance practice, including a history
of adversarial bargaining with workers, enormous power inequities, and laws that
prohibit unions from acquiring a governance role in the corporation.3 ' Arguably, strong
political, economic and social norms will act as a barrier to any fundamental changes in
corporate governance norms absent legislative intervention. While there may be a good
business case to be made for long-term shareholder or enterprise wealth maximization,
it is unlikely to occur without intervention in the "market." This is because the
transaction costs of accomplishing this may be viewed as too high, and the benefits of
a redistributive nature as too great a challenge to existing property norms, to be
acceptable to many shareholders.
In contrast, other scholars suggest that global capital markets will create
convergence notwithstanding political and historical influences. 33 The mobility of
capital, the merger or cross-listing initiatives of international stock exchanges, the global
transfer of both debt and equity will result in convergence of corporate governance
norms. Visentini observes that when the allocation of economic resources takes place
only as a function of an efficiency drive, markets may overrule domestic legislation and
there is a danger that global companies will not be adequately regulated in any
jurisdiction.34 Path dependence and market convergence theory both have merit and are
not mutually exclusive. Historical economic and political structures set strong
normative and regulatory frameworks in which corporate governance practice is
determined. Convergence pressure is therefore likely to result in alteration of these
regulatory frameworks, but not a complete merger or immersion in capital markets.
B.

The Role of Ownership and CapitalStructures

A sizeable number of the world's corporations continue to be closely,
domestically held (including family owned and state owned enterprises), or part of an
intricate set of cross-holdings. Governance of corporations is shaped by their internal
capital, share and management structures. For example, for Anglo-American

"' Ibid. See also C. Milhaupt, "Property Rights in Firms" (1998) 84 Va. L. Rev. 1145;
J. Coffee, "The Future as History: Prospects for Global Corporate Governance and its
Implications" (1999) 93 Nw. U.L. Rev. 641.
32 "Human Capital Era", supra note 10 at 947.
31 Coffee, supra note 31 at 642.
14 Visentini, supra note 2.
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corporations with widely held share ownership, corporate governance mechanisms are
usually aimed at controlling opportunistic behaviour by powerful managers in order to
protect dispersed shareholders who lack the resources, information and incentive to
effectively monitor their activities. In contrast, the governance challenge in closely held,
cross-held or block-held corporate structures such as in Germany, Italy, Japan and parts
of minority shareholders from powerful
of Asia, has been to protect the interests
35
controlling shareholders or blockholders
The ownership structure is, in part, a determinant of differences in attitude to
risk and resultant incentives to monitor. Ralph Heinrich has suggested that increased
concentration of ownership creates a higher incentive to monitor and thus reduces
information asymmetries, however it also creates a concurrent risk aversion that can
impact on managers' decision making. 6 If the corporation takes a higher portion of
debt, this effect is mitigated because the risk is shifted to creditors who do not have to
share any upside benefits. Thus equity owners will tolerate higher levels of risk. This
may explain why block-held firm sor many mergers and acquisitions are highly
leveraged. Heinrich observes that the countervailing effects of changes in ownership
create a role for capital structures as an additional complementary governance
instrument. Thus the broadly accepted link between concentrated ownership and level
of monitoring needs to be qualified to account for leveraging. Although there are higher
agency costs of debt, an ownership structure that shifts risk to creditors can mitigate
these costs in order to achieve higher monitoring.
While leveraging thus reduces shareholder risks, the costs are transferred to
creditors. As noted above, however, the difficulty with shifting the risk to creditors is
that it assumes that creditors have bargained a risk premium and have the ability to
diversify risk. Many creditors are unsecured lenders, and except for a few statutorily
preferred claims, this shift in risk creates a distributive transfer in value from equity to
debt investors, the latter of whom are in no better position to protect themselves from
managerial opportunism or shirking than are small investors. Thus excessive risk taking
behaviour by managers disproportionately shifts the cost of that behaviour away from
equity holders to unsecured creditors, not to senior secured lenders who have the
information and bargaining power to protect their investments. Anglo-American
governance theory is therefore grounded not only in property norms, but in a
preconceived hierarchy ofproperty that is to be protected. Property claims by unsecured
creditors are not properly accounted for, or protected, in the period where a corporation
is solvent but the officers engage in excessive risk taking. Hence capital structures
heavily influence governance and who bears the costs of corporate decisions.
There are both private and public law issues in the role of ownership and the
governance structures generated. The ownership structure of the corporation both
shapes the internal mechanisms that ensure effective oversight and planning and

" See M.J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners, The PoliticalRoots ofAmerican
CorporateFinance(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). See also Becht, supra note 27.
36 R. Heinrich, Complementarities in Corporate Governance: Ownership Structure,
Capital Structure, Monitoring and Pecuniary Incentives (Duesternbrooker, Germany: Kiel
Institute of World Economics, 2000) at 3, 10.
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responds to the regulatory regime that sets the climate for capital investment. a7 In North
America and Europe, complex securities and corporations regulatory frameworks have
developed to deal with particular ownership structures and to encourage economic
activity, while simultaneously creating varying degrees of accountability to investors.
Becht has observed that in global capital markets, investors are likely to participate in
liquid markets so that they can spread their risks more widely and exit easily if
dissatisfied with corporate performance.38 In turn, corporations that attract many
investors and have a liquid market in their shares benefit from lower cost capital and are
thus more competitive.39 Governance choices are driven largely by access to capital.
Diversification of ownership creates accountability problems between managers and
dispersed shareholders, whereas concentration of ownership reduces potential for
liquidity, a main advantage of dispersed ownership, but such ownership allows for
lower-cost monitoring.
Yet concentrated voting power creates a risk of
blockholder/managerial collusion to the detriment of small shareholders.4" The move
towards more liquid capital markets presents these investors with the benefits of easier
exit but also the problem of reduced ability to monitor managers. Thus ownership and
governance structures influence and reflect one another.
The growth of multinational corporations and increase in mergers and
acquisitions has also necessitated the need to merge ownership and corporate
governance mechanisms that function in different economic systems. The impact of
cross-border ownership and cross-corporate culture has not yet been fully explored. The
assumption has been that more active capital markets will lead to unquestioning
adoption of Anglo-American models of ownership and corporate governance that are
characteristic of liquid capital markets. There is some evidence to support this.
However, it is equally plausible that new hybrid models of governance will emerge to
reflect more complex capital structures. A corporation owned and registered in one
country will be required to comply with domestic law of another, but also required to
comply with foreign public laws in terms of governance, consumer protection, antidiscrimination laws, officer liability and credit systems; thus creating governance models
that cross boundaries and systems.4 A deeper understanding of how different capital
structures and economic systems raise different governance issues is necessary in order
to appreciate the convergence debate.

" M.C. Jensen, "The Modem Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal
Control Systems" (1993) 48 J. Finance 831 at 863-65. See also H.G. Manne, "Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control" (1965) 73 J. Polit. Economy. 110. See also W.J. Carney, "The
Legacy of the 'Market for Corporate Control' and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm" (1999)
50 Case W. R. L. Rev. 215.
38 Supra note 27 at 23.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 One example is the recent merger of Daimler-Chrysler, with its head office in
Germany, ownership primarily in Germany and the United States, and trading on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) in the years prior to the merger. See D.E. Logue & J.K. Seward,
"Anatomy of a Governance Transformation: The Case of Daimler-Benz" (1999) 62:3 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 87.
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III. How THE SYMPTOMS

OF INEFFECTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MANIFEST
THEMSELVES: DIVERGENT SYSTEMS, DIFFERENT CHALLENGES

At the heart of the governance debate is the question of how to allow corporate
officers to make effective decisions and create wealth, while ensuring that they are
accountable to investors.42 While it may seem convenient to global capital investors, it
may be impracticable to expect that North American norms of governance will be
imported wholesale into corporations operating in diverse systems. Equally, however,
investors will be hesitant to invest their capital in jurisdictions where there is legitimate
concern over fundamental notions such as property rights, shareholder remedies, and
accountability by corporate decision makers for their governance decisions. The
discussion below is designed to summarize some of the key differences among several
divergent economic systems and corporate control structures in order to try and identify
some of the signs of ineffective governance in each. 3 These signs must be recognized
in order to appreciate the convergence debate: to assess whether there can be divergent
systems but more universal principles for corporate governance, and if so, what they
should include.
A.

Anglo-American Corporations:DispersedOwnership,LiquidMarkets

The Anglo-American model of corporate governance is a function of widely
held corporations. The capitalization of U.S. corporations was accomplished by equity
investments of numerous widely dispersed shareholders. The result was the
predominance of corporate structures whereby strong managers controlled the
corporation, and dispersed shareholders lacked the information or resources to
effectively monitor these managers.' This power vested with those with little equity
stake and little direct accountability, created conditions for opportunistic behaviour,
shirking, and failure to effectively enhance shareholder value. Berle and Means
described the concentration of economic activity, dispersed ownership and powerful
managers as a "separation of ownership and control," posing questions for governance
that continue to occupy American legal scholars and regulators today.45 They also
discussed whether governance should include accountability to diverse stakeholders, a
part of their dialogue that is largely lost; this issue is explored below.
Under Anglo-American corporate structures, shareholders must incur additional
agency costs in monitoring managerial behaviour, and in attempting to better align the
interests of managers with those of shareholders. The regulatory system responded to
the governance problems resulting from widely dispersed ownership through securities

42 I define investors as all those who invest in the corporation in terms of equity capital,
debt and human capital.
3 Readers should refer to the extensive literature for a comprehensive understanding
of these capital structures.
I A. A. Berle & G.C. Means, The Modern Corporationand PrivateProperty (New
Clearing House, 1932) at 355-56.
York: Commerce
41

Ibid. at 71.
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regulation, consumer protection laws, and corporations laws apportioning responsibility
and liability among the corporate legal personality and directors and officers in their
fiduciary capacity. Within this regulatory system, corporations are left with a variety of
options for public and private financing, and particularly, with choices regarding stock
exchanges with varying levels of disclosure and standards. Dispersed ownership is
viewed as optimal because the resulting liquid capital markets ensure an objective
mechanism for monitoring and assessing managerial performance. Dispersed ownership
encourages risk-taking and ultimately reduces the cost of capital. 6 Both statutory and
common law codification of fiduciary obligation have created a benchmark against
which the activities of corporate managers are measured. The benchmark of"in the best
interests of the corporation" is broadly worded but normatively narrowly defined as
shareholder wealth maximization.
However, the ownership structure of Anglo-American corporations has been
changing and shares are no longer uniformly and widely dispersed. Even though the
majority of shares continue to be widely held, there is frequently concentration of
ownership by large investors, either pre-initial public offering owners or institutional
investors. Under this model, equity investors can acquire additional blocks of shares
and an active market exists for partial control changes.47 As a result, governance in
Anglo-American corporations is not static, and changing capital structures reflect that
corporations have not yet found the optimal mix of accountability and officer discretion
to make decisions that maximize value. Anglo-American governance norms have been
accompanied by private law initiatives such as shareholder agreements and share
purchase rights plans in corporate charter documents. These developments have created
new tensions in accountability and governance. For example, mechanisms to influence
the market for corporate control, such as poison pills and break-up fees, have a tendency
to entrench managers.48 This, combined with jurisprudence according high deference
to business judgments, has worked in some instances to diminish accountability.
Current initiatives to reform U.S. securities regulation, through overly rigid
interpretation of the ordinary business exception, have extended a trend toward
diminishing shareholder participation and thus the ability of institutional and other
shareholders to hold managers accountable.49 For example, Ayotte suggests that the
courts, upholding the SEC's elimination of shareholder participation regarding social
policies, have further aggravated the issue of separation and control, instead of
enhancing corporate democracy."
There has been a substantial increase in institutional shareholder activism
aimed at enhancing corporate accountability. This has taken the form of "voice", in
46 N. Georgakopoulos, "Corporate Defense Law for Dispersed Ownership" (Canadian
Law and Economics Association Annual Conference, Toronto, Canada, September 2000) at 53,
54 [unpublished, archived with author, cited with permission].
41See C. Mayer, "Ownership Matters" (Inaugural Lecture ofthe Leo Goldschmidt Chair
in Corporate Governance, Universit6 Libre de Bruxelles, 10 February 2000), online: European
Corporate Governance Network <http://www.ecgn.ulb.ac.be/ecgnispeeches/htm> (last modified:
11 February 2000).
48 Ibid.
49C.L. Ayotte, "Re-evaluating the Shareholder Proposal Rule in the Wake of Cracker
Barreland the Era of Institutional Investors" (1999) 48 Cath. U. L. Rev. 511 at 539.
'oIbid. at 512, 541-43, 551.
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the sense of informal influences on corporate officers, and a more direct intervention in
the form of board seats and shareholder proposals. Institutional investors have the
resources and information to monitor managers. Moreover, while the prospect of exit
affords these investors bargaining power, other regulatory restrictions hinder exit, thus
leaving voice as the defacto option. In some cases of U.S. pension funds and Canadian
labour-sponsored investment funds (LSIFs), the exercise of shareholder voice has been
aimed at more communitarian goals, in terms of measuring effective governance by
assessing performance in employment and safety standards and environmental
sustainability. This creates a new set of tensions in terms of the shareholder wealth
maximization paradigm.
While the Anglo-American dispersed ownership model generated a regulatory
framework aimed at holding managers accountable through disclosure standards,
transparency of securities markets and prohibitions on particular types of self-dealing
transactions, there continues to be serious issues of accountability. Shareholders have
attempted to reduce agency problems and align managers' interests with those of equity
investors by compensation practices that give equity or options. However, this can also
create non-alignment of interests in a widely held corporation, because the lack of
diversification of managers' holdings may discourage risk taking, contrary to the
interests of diversified equity holders. These attempts at the reduction of agency costs
may actually result in increased conflicts in governance priorities. Moreover, a constant
challenge in this capital market is to ensure that the conduct of investment advisors and
securities professionals, who act as intermediaries in liquid securities markets, do not
create another layer of unaccountability for equity investors. Rather than enhance
shareholder participation, governance reform has been aimed at disclosure and
transparency of corporate transactions and decision making. The premise is that
investors will exit if dissatisfied with corporate performance, thus causing securities
markets and the resultant market for corporate control to influence and ultimately
enhance corporate governance. Exit is the only means of exercizing preferences. The
Anglo-American regime has been less effective in enhancing shareholder participation
rights and thus in creating accountability though "voice," as opposed to "exit". It is
premised on the fact that shareholders have no incentive to monitor where exit is easier.
If investors exit in sufficient numbers, the market sends a message to the corporation to
change its managers or its governance practices." While this focus strengthens capital
markets, it is unclear as to whether it enhances long-term governance of the corporation.
The system thus fails to address a more active voice in governance, whereby
investors articulate their governance priorities and preferences. The "right to influence
the corporation" is viewed as participation at general shareholder meetings, board
elections and voting on fundamental transactions. Shareholders do not vote on
economic and operational issues that directly impact on sustainability, long term return
on equity investments, workers, or the communities in which they are situated; nor do
they act as an accountability check on managers who do have carriage of such

"' See F.H. Easterbrook & D.R. Fischel, "Voting in Corporate Law" (1983) 26 J. L.
Econ. 395.
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decisions. 52 Although shareholders should be able to bring forward proposals, there is
often a pre-condition of a specified number of shares and a broad discretion by
managers to prevent the proposals being placed on the agenda. These restrictions are
aimed at preventing frivolous shareholder proposals, however, they also make a
normative choice regarding which kinds of shareholders will have participation rights,
i.e. institutional shareholders, blockholders and controlling shareholders, many of whom
already influence corporate decision making.
This in turn may have distributional consequences. It does not allow individual
investors to bring forward proposals because they do not have the resources and
information to adequately monitor or to solicit support from across a broad range of
shareholders. When shareholders do make proposals they can be excluded for a variety
of reasons, under ordinary business exceptions or under the prohibitions in corporations
statutes on shareholder proposals aimed at social issues. 3 While shareholder proposals
are of a non-binding nature, permitting their circulation and a shareholder voice would
provide normative guidance to corporate officers, even if they decided to act otherwise.
Further, a greater use of technology in shareholder voting could facilitate a new era of
shareholder participation in governance, yet the Anglo-American system is resistant to
greater investor activism.
With the recent tragic events in the United States and the resulting economic
shock and capital market reaction, we do not yet have the data to assess the different
ways in which economic systems and corporate governance structures deal with such
economic shocks. It is evident that the economic consequences for workers, trade
suppliers and small investors needs further study. In particular, the issue of how current
governance, regulatory and market mechanisms apportion such economic shock among
the stakeholders in the firm, and whether the resulting apportionment appropriately
distributes the costs, deserves further investigation.
B.

German Corporations: Concentrated Ownership and Control, Nascent
Securities Markets, and Co-Determination

In contrast to the Anglo-American model, the central European model of
corporate governance is a function of closely held or block-held domestic capital
structures, and public policy choices about the role of multiple stakeholders, such as
creditors and workers. For example, 80% of the top 170 firms listed on French and
German stock exchanges have a single shareholder who owns more than 25% of
shares."4 In Germany there are large "blockholders" who own or control large blocks

52 See L. Dallas, "The Control and Conflict of Interest in Voting Systems" (1992) 71
N. C. L. Rev. 1.
13 An example was section 137(5) of the Canada Business CorporationsAct, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-44, as am. by S.C. 2001, c. 14, which until November 2001 expressly prohibited
proposals promoting general economic, social or political causes. It now requires the proposal
to relate in a significant way to the business or affairs of the corporation.
5' E. Boehmer, Business Groups,Bank Control andLarge Shareholders:An Analysis
of German Takeovers (Bonn, Germany: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 1998) at 6.
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of shares, primarily banks and other corporations. 5 Generally, the influence of banks,
as large blockholders, varies depending on whether the power is over debt or equity
markets.56 For example, in Belgium, France and Sweden, banks are an integral part of
links between different business groups, and thus their monitoring is manifested through
that means." For closely held corporations or those with complex cross-holdings,
block-holding or pyramid structures, governance problems are created by alignment of
the interests of managers with controlling shareholders or blockholders. This is
frequently to the detriment of minority shareholders and foreign shareholders, because
their interests are disregarded or control premiums are extracted through self-dealing
transactions.
German corporations are more highly leveraged, and thus debt, as well as the
equity that banks vote on behalf of investors' deposits, plays a strong governance role.
This capital structure and governance role of banks historically resulted in little need for
developed securities markets and thus there was little impetus to develop strong
protections for minority shareholder interests. This was further influenced by public
policy that recognizes the importance of lending institutions and employees within the
governance structure of the corporation. The result is a governance structure with less
pressure to maximize short-term shareholder value, and more attention to other
stakeholders. While capital is less liquid, corporations are also less subject to the wide
fluctuations that accompany rapid changes in investor confidence. For example, rapid
capital market changes do not result in immediate labour shedding and thus the negative
impact on employees is generally less extreme. More recently, as Germany has sought
to attract international capital to remain competitive globally, there are more active
securities markets, although these are still ancillary to the banks as the primary source
of capital. While these securities markets allow corporations to diversify their capital
structures, securities trading services are most often offered by the banks.58 Thus, while
there is greater access to a mix of debt and equity, and some competition between the
two, both are still largely available through the banks. Only recently have there been
changes to governance structures to enhance minority shareholder accountability, such
as new insider trading rules, in part a result of greater competition for capital.
Corporate governance objectives in Germany have also been mandated by the
statutory framework. Governance has been aimed at encouraging the boards to manage
for the good of the enterprise, including both equity investors and the public welfare.
This is reflected in the co-determination model, a two-tiered corporate board structure

" M.J. Roe, "Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan and the
United States" (1993) 102 Yale L. J. 1927 at 1929. Banks vote equity left on deposit, unless
instructed otherwise by the equity owner.
56 See R. Romano, "Comment of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, Corporate
Ownership Around the World" (1998), online: European Corporate Governance Network
<http://www.ecgn.orglecgn/conference98/robertaromanocomments.htm> (last modified: 29
April 1999).
"' Becht, supra note 27 at 37. In Italy, before implementation of the EC Second
Directive on Banking, commercial banks could not hold shares directly, but could hold shares in
investment banks which in turn held shares in industrial corporations; Visentini, supra note 2 at
838.
58 Visentini, ibid at 840-41.
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in which workers and shareholders participate on a supervisory board and daily decision
making is undertaken by a separate managerial board. Co-determination is strongly
supported by stakeholders and public policy, and thus involves some sharing of power
and militates against corporate opportunism. Co-determination has translated itself in
the workplace in the form of works councils. Works councils are essentially
collaborative processes to enhance production, workers' voice in strategic planning, and
stronger commitments to retraining and health and safety. Corporate officers, through
a series ofcollaborative strategies, pursue both shareholder wealth maximization and the
economic and social health of the enterprise and its workers.
However, the two-tier board structure, while designed to reflect different
stakeholder interests, has created a different kind of accountability concern. While the
supervisory boards of the largest corporations are comprised of equal numbers of
employees and shareholders, the Board Chair is always a shareholder and has the casting
vote. Moreover, for smaller corporations, employees comprise a much smaller
percentage of board membership. "Employee" membership on the board includes
supervisors, professionals and unionized workers, whose interests frequently diverge.
Board oversight is undermined by infrequent board meetings, unduly large and unwieldy
board size, and untimely and inadequate disclosure to board members. There is also a
problem of managers bypassing the supervisory board and thus exacerbating
accountability problems. 9 The banks participate both as equity holders on the
supervisory board and as blockholders intervening directly with managers. The latter
raises concern regarding any control premiums that they may be extracting. Moreover,
German law allows for a broader scope of shareholder participation at general meetings,
a role employed by banks." Thus concerns about shareholder rights are those faced by
minority shareholders in light of "strong blockholders and weak owners."'"
Within corporations with a high concentration of shareholding, there is
considerable difference in controlling shareholder voting, with the U. K. dominated by
institutional investors such as life insurance companies and financial institutions,
whereas Austrian, Italian and French ownership is dominated by family, individual and
non-financial companies.62 Many corporations in these jurisdictions are a complex
arrangement of pyramid holdings, block-holdings and cross-holdings, where a few
shareholders or blockholders exert considerable influence over corporate decision
making. 63 Lack of disclosure of ownership holdings, voting control and transactions that
may benefit particular blocks of shareholdings also creates potential for abuse and risk
of extraction of control premiums. Lack of transparency in both ownership and material
foreseeable risk hinders outside investors' ability to assess the stewardship of the
corporation. Thus the governance issues differ from those presented by dispersed

" V. Dinh, "Co-determination and Corporate Governance in a Multinational Business
Enterprise" (1999) 24 J.Corp. Law 975 at 981-83.
60 Visentini, supra note 2 at 844.
6 Becht, supra note 27 at 4.
62 See C. Mayer, "Firm Control" (Inaugural Lecture, Oxford University, 18 February
1999), online: European Corporate Governance Network <httT://www.ecgn.ulb.ac.be/ecgn
/docs/EUcontrolproiect/inaugural%201ecture.pdt> (date accessed: 28 November 2001).
63 Ibid. at 11. See also L. Zingales, "The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the
Milan Stock Exchange Experience" (1994) 7 Rev. Finan. Stud. 125.
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ownership. Much of the governance debate centres around the separation of ownership
and control, however, within this debate there are complex issues of the meaning of
control, be it formal voting power, influence or monitoring power, the influence of
cross-shareholding, and degrees of separation.'
The move to global capital markets has created different kinds of convergence
pressures, discussed in part IV. Even prior to the events of fall 2001 and the subsequent
market reaction, recessionary trends in the United States and Asia have resulted in
decreased capital spending. There have been economic consequences for Germany and
other EU states that rely on these markets for their consumer goods. The slowdown in
economic activity globally has resulted in some labour shedding by German based
corporations, although these appear to involve facilities outside of Germany, where
Anglo-American type cost cutting is a more acceptable norm. Continued economic
decline may place pressure on these corporations to make adjustments domestically,
which would create considerable tensions with existing norms regarding governance.
C.

JapaneseCorporations:Cross-Holdings,Under-DevelopedSecuritiesMarkets
and "Lifetime Employment"

Japanese corporations are characterized by a system of cross-holdings, with
Keiretsus structured both vertically, where suppliers play a direct governance role in
terms of their relations with the corporation, and horizontally, in which there may be one
bank and a number of member firms.65 Generally, banks as debt holders are also the
largest equity holders, and thus corporate governance structures emerged to utilize this
pattern of ownership, debt and control.66 While the capital structures thus differ from
continental Europe, Japanese securities markets are also underdeveloped. The structure
of ownership and debt historically resulted in little dependence on capital markets, low
liquidity because of the size and complexity of cross-holdings, and underdevelopment
of securities regulation.
Japan has been characterized by a single board structure of corporate
governance, with the banks as a dominant influence. There are other powerful social
and cultural structures, such as suppliers' clubs and presidents' clubs, that exert a strong
normative influence on the activities of corporate managers.67 Non-bank shareholders
have not been powerful and thus banks have acted as a temper on the pure shareholder
wealth maximization model. For example, the bank-centred model ensures that implicit
contracts with workers are respected, giving rise to norms that are characterized as
"lifelong employment" by Japanese legal scholars.6" Thus capital structure has a
powerful influence on how workers and other interests are accounted for in the firm.

Mayer, supra note 62 at 9.
M. Fukao, FinancialIntegration, CorporateGovernance and the Performance of
MultinationalCorporations(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999) at 100-101.
66 S.D. Prowse, "The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Japan" (1992) 47 J. Fin.
1121 at 1126.
67 Roe, supra note 55 at 101.
st
68 M. Nakahigashi, "Corporate Governance in Japan in the 2 1 Century: A Comment
on Nottage" (April, 2000) at 3 [unpublished, archived with author, cited with permission].
"
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Japan's corporate governance system, like Germany's, has a somewhat
communitarian focus. Corporate governance has emphasized protection of employee and
creditor interests, which are considered at least as important as shareholder interests.69
The governance structure harmonizes relationships among corporate officers,
shareholders and workers.7" This stakeholder model arises out of a complex post-war
economic and political history, in which long-term employment evolved in response to
massive labour unrest and production takeover strikes. The illiquidity ofJapanese labour
and capital markets created a higher incentive to invest in workers over the long-term,
in turn creating corporate structures and cultures that were stable and resulted in highly
productive collaboration. 7 The regime did not evolve from express policy decisions
recognizing and valuing human capital, but rather is a complex development of worker
activism, its structural response, and a governance system that now strongly recognizes
and values team production, collaboration and co-operative dispute resolution. In turn,
corporate structures and the workplace climate generated have more easily adapted to
competitive pressures of global capital markets, technological changes and the need to
design new competitive work processes.72 This stakeholder model has been buttressed
by judicial decisions that have protected workers' human capital investments.7"
Unlike Germany, where employee board membership arises out of
representation by constituency (workers or shareholders), Japanese workers'
representation on corporate boards is accomplished through employees being promoted
to inside directors as a function of their contributions to the firm. This acquisition of
voice in corporate decision-making protects against expropriation of their firm specific
human capital investments, and has allowed corporations to acquire market flexibility.74
This is not worker representation in terms of a concerted labour voice.75 However,
employees are promoted to director status from all hierarchical levels of the corporation,
and thus reflect voices from all parts of the corporate structure.76 Thus Japanese capital
and governance structures have worked to create a wealth maximization model not
aimed purely at shareholder wealth maximization. It includes a normative conception
of long-time employment and incentives to invest in industry and firm specific human
capital. It turn, this has resulted in high loyalty and buy-in to the objectives of

Roe, supra note 55 at 101.
M. Aoki, "Toward an Economic Model ofthe Japanese Firm" (1990) 28 J. Econ. Lit.
1 [hereinafter "Economic Model"].
"' R.J. Gilson & M. J. Roe, "Lifetime Employment: Labour Peace and the Evolution of
Japanese Corporate Governance" (1999) 99 Colum. L. Rev. 508 at 531.
72 See "Economic Model", supra note 70. See also supranote 71 at 537. The model may
also be a function of variable incentive-based wages, which developed incentives for firms to
engage in human capital skills training without fear of employee or competitor opportunism.
" Gibson & Roe, ibid. at 526. The authors point out that court decisions have protected
employees by requiring employers to show economic need in order to downsize, worker
consultation and exhausted alternatives to layoffs.
' M. Aoki, "The Participatory Generation of Information Rents and the Theory of the
Firm" in M. Aoki et al, eds., The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties (London: Sage Publications, 1990)
at 26-28.
" Although unions are tied to corporate enterprises and thus tend to develop
collaborative as opposed to adversarial relations in their representation of workers.
76 Interview with M. Nakahigashi (30 March 2001).
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enhancing productivity and internal labour markets, in terms of employee and
shareholder wealth maximization. Advancement in the corporation is frequently
measured by contributions to the team process, as opposed to individual contributions.
However, this has also been a highly gendered view of the recognition of
employees' contributions to the firm, and thus Japanese governance structures, while
communitarian in focus, suffer from inconsistencies. Women are not given access to
many jobs that provide long-term employment assurances, because there continues to
be deeply imbedded norms that women must make a choice between career and
marriage/child bearing.77 Recent equal opportunity laws may begin to address these
issues, but they inadequately address broad equitable remedies and more systemic
change. Interestingly, the value structure of Japanese corporations, such as
collaboration and non-adversarial resolution of disputes through social relations, are
structures -that require enormous time commitments outside of working hours, thus
conflicting with women's caregiving obligations. While these changes are slowly being
addressed, they highlight the fact that non-aggressive and more co-operative models do
not necessarily include all stakeholder voices.
Concentrated ownership in Japan has also led to the underdevelopment of
minority shareholder protection, and the risk of extraction of greater control premiums.
While shareholders have access to derivative type suits, there are no oppression
remedies available. The emphasis on employee protection rather than on an exclusive
shareholder wealth maximization objective, has resulted in Japan being less competitive
in attracting capital in global markets. This has changed somewhat in the past ten years,
as Japan has increasingly looked to international capital markets to raise additional
capital and reduce reliance on the banks. A number of firms are now listing on AngloAmerican stock exchanges. In turn, this has required Japanese firms to comply with
disclosure and other Anglo-American securities requirements, thus imposing greater
transparency requirements on Japanese corporations.78 This is also creating enormous
pressure on Japanese corporations to move away from their communitarian focus.
Japan is now facing considerable convergence pressure because of an economic
slowdown. There has been pressure to revamp securities regulation, to merge exchanges,
to shift the structure of some exchanges to stock corporations, and to create a higher
measure of transparency. There is also some pressure from international investors to
move to an Anglo-American style governance, although the vast majority of Japanese
corporations continue to retain their governance structures and norms. The Nissan
Corporation is one of the very few examples wherein massive cost cutting and labour
shedding has occurred. However, even in this case, there is a blend of Japanese and
American governance norms, rather than a wholesale adoption of the Anglo-American

I J.S. Fan, "From Office Ladies to Women Warriors? The Effect of the EEOL on
Japanese Women" (1999) 10 UCLA Women's L.J 103 at 105-09, 116. See also R. Yamakawa,
"We've Only Just Begun: The Law of Sexual Harassment in Japan" (1999) 22 Hastings Int'l &
Comp. L. Rev. 523 at 527.
78 See M. Aoki, "The Japanese Firm as a System of Attributes: A Survey and Research
Agenda" in M. Aoki & R. Dore, eds., The JapaneseFirm: The Sources of Competitive Strength
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
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approach.79 There continues to be substantial resistance to move towards AngloAmerican norms, such as the Keidanren (Japanese Federation of Economic
Organizations) resistance to a current legislative proposal requiring every large
corporation to have at least one outside director on its board. Moreover, even within a
restructuring climate, the interests of employees as key stakeholders continues to be a
priority, thus generating a search for more efficient structures that account for these
interests and costs.
D.

The IntersectionofDiverse GovernanceModels and CapitalMarkets: "Voice"
or "Exit"

The evaluation of Japan and Germany's corporate governance systems against
Anglo-American norms warrants several observations. First, these systems are
characterized by their under-developed securities markets and thus lack of
competitiveness in global capital markets. As these countries seek international capital,
much of which is grounded in Anglo-American securities regimes, they will be required
to move towards a system of enhanced protection of shareholder interests, to the
possible detriment of other corporate investors and community members. The high
leverage characteristics of these systems also raises concerns regarding the ability to
finance technology-based firms, start-ups and other aspects of the new economy,
because to date these have been largely funded by equity investments, particularly
venture capital financing. Thus, these economies may be at some disadvantage in the
competition for capital. These are legitimate issues, but they are not the only
considerations.
The concern about liquid capital markets is key, but also masks a number of
problems that Anglo-American investors face. Concurrent with the growing competition
for capital is the need for capital to find new markets. Given the colossal failures in
emerging and transitional economies, central European and Japanese markets are more
desirable. Yet capital investors have difficulty not only with weaknesses in minority
shareholder rights, but also with the more communitarian norms reflective of corporate
governance in these countries. This concern is cast as an efficiency debate. In
Germany, co-determination is attacked as inefficient because of worker participation on
corporate boards, and because blockholders and controlling shareholders bypass that
structure and influence managers directly. It is also "inefficient" because shareholder
wealth maximization is not paramount as a corporate objective. It has been argued that
correlation exists between co-determination and under-development of deep securities
markets because of the tendency of blockholders to bypass the board and directly
influence managerial decision-making.80 While there is little doubt that Germany's
model of governance has created accountability problems, it is much less clear that this
is a function of co-determination. Even without employee representation on supervisory
boards, minority and foreign shareholders would have great difficulty in keeping
managers accountable. This is because the structure of decision-making has enshrined
infrequent meetings, information asymmetries, unwieldy board size, and rent-seeking
7 Nakahigashi, supra note 76.
80 M. Roe, "German Co-determination and German Securities Markets" (1999) 5
Colum. J. Eur. L. 199 at 201.
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behaviour by blockholders and controlling shareholders. Rather than cast the debate in
terms of pressure to eliminate the role of workers, one should more carefully consider
the structural and normative governance problems associated with centralized ownership
and control structures, and how the governance role of debt has been underplayed in this
analysis. One could adoptmore explicit models with particular rights and accountability
attached to co-determination.
Co-determination potentially allows for alliances between workers and minority
shareholders in terms of maximizing wealth of the enterprise. Both could arguably
benefit from enhanced monitoring of managers on the shop floor and at the board level.
A co-determination model that situated information, decisions and accountability within
the supervisory board could address many of the shareholder concerns raised. One
would then be left with the one issue where there is truly normative disagreement,
specifically that under German and similar governance models, corporations are
managed in the interests of broader numbers of stakeholders. It is this disagreement that
needs to be made transparent in the governance debate, because it challenges the AngloAmerican shareholder wealth maximization paradigm.
The difficulty with scholarship on comparative corporate governance is that it
frequently assumes that efficiency, broadly defined as shareholder wealth maximization
and externalization of numerous costs, is the single goal of corporate governance. Only
rarely is this narrow concept of efficiency challenged in Anglo-American economies.
Thus, governance is measured from this model, and does not take account of other
normative policy goals that create optimal wealth maximization, with the costs measured
differently.
Ron Gilson has suggested that the cost of stability created by the bank-centred
governance model is less adaptive efficiency. 81 He suggests that competitive success
will require both "commitment" in terms of stability for workers and other investors, and
"adaptability" to changing technology and markets. Yet these are often traded off in the
search for efficiency. The governance challenge is to craft a model that balances these
institutional considerations in order to achieve optimal governance strategies. As well,
there are specific issues arising in emerging and transitional economies; in particular,
complex issues regarding capital markets and relationships between these economies
and developed nations and international lenders. These issues are too complex and
diverse to be given adequate treatment here.
Thus, divergence within corporate systems creates different kinds of
governance issues. What is common to a variety of structures, however, is that the
interests of managers can diverge considerably from those of investors, where an
investor is broadly defined as all those with an interest in the activities of the
corporation. The outside investor frequently suffers from information asymmetries and
inadequate resources to effectively monitor corporate activity. There is also a free-rider
effect, where some shareholders benefit from others incurring the costs of monitoring.
Too large a free-rider problem can result in inadequate monitoring of corporate decisionmakers. Where there are poor regulatory practices, this creates potential for wealth
expropriation by managers and controlling shareholders. Similarly, information
"IR.J. Gilson, "Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When do Institutions
Matter?" (1996) 74 Wash. U.L.Q. 327 at 341.

Ottawa Law Review IRevue de droit d'Ottawa

[Vol 33:1

asymmetries prevent community members from properly monitoring for risk of
environmental or consumer harms, or, in the case where harm has already been imposed,
from successfully pursuing claims in tort against the actual decision-makers.
More recently, institutional investors, who are faced with less liquidity, have
sought to exercise voice and vote in the governance of the corporation. This is most
prevalent in the United States, but is increasing in Europe as domestic laws have freed
up the ability of institutional investors to enter global capital markets.82 Evidence of the
rise in institutional investors in E.U. markets and a decrease in the percentage of
holdings of the large banks means that these shifts in capital structures are likely to also
result in shifts in governance structure.83 The interests in corporate governance diverge
not only within differing economies but also among the stakeholders in the corporation.
Shareholders have differing investment timelines, different risk capabilities and different
resources and information to engage in monitoring. Creditors, particularly senior
lenders, have different kinds of governance concerns. Arguably, they have the
bargaining power to extract both information and a risk premium in their negotiations
for lending capital. However, this assumes that there is a regulatory and judicial
framework in place to enforce contractual or securities violations.
The governance debate has resulted in considerable convergence towards a
conceptual understanding of corporate governance as necessary to enhancing corporate
performance, effectively monitoring activities of managers, and protecting shareholder
rights. This debate and the resulting framework, however, have been largely situated
within a structure of widely-dispersed share ownership that continues to characterize
U.S. corporations. The governance debate has also been situated in the context of clear
regulatory rules under securities and corporations legislation, comprehensive
mechanisms for enforcement, an independentjudiciary to enforce shareholder remedies,
and a strong common law tradition of fiduciary obligation. Thus, much of AngloAmerican scholarship focuses on the private law aspects of corporate governance
because the relatively well-developed regulatory framework and strong independent
judicial system is an operating assumption. Anglo-American scholars take for granted
a well-defined system of ownership registration and property protection. Although there
have been some notable failures in the North American governance regime, for the most
part, corporations operate within a regulatory regime that minimizes the risk of such
failures, and the regime has in place an infrastructure that will generally respond to the
discovery of regulatory failures.84 In such cases, the state will intervene and collaborate
with the private sector to respond to the particular regulatory deficiency.
A key issue is whether other jurisdictions ought to import Anglo-American
corporate governance norms and practices in a bid to attract global capital, and whether
Sarra, supra note 21at 386-94.
For example, the merger ofDaimler-Chrysler reduced holdings of the Deutsche Bank
by 10% and increased the level of dispersed ownership, online: Daimler Chrysler
<http://www.daimlerchrysler.com/indexe.htm?/investor/meeting2000/hvglossare.htm> (date
accessed: 13 November 2001).
" For example, in response to the Bre-X scandal in Canada, a joint Toronto Stock
Exchange/Ontario Securities Commission Task Force addressed Standards for listing mining
sector corporations; Ontario, Toronto Stock Exchange/Ontario Securities Commission, Setting
New Standards: Recommendations for Public Mineral Exploration and Mining Companies
(Toronto: TSE/OSC, 1999).
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capital investors will require such standards. For example, it has been suggested that
developing and transitional economies should be allowed to shape their own governance
systems for their emerging markets.85 There is political and social resistance to
wholesale importation of Anglo-American norms, and this resistance may or may not
counter market pressure for convergence. Moreover, importing these norms and
practices may not be effective in dealing with problems of corporate governance that
differ from those to which the Anglo-American model responds. Nevertheless, pressure
to adopt these norms may be applied by investors who will be reluctant to invest in
corporations whose governance norms are unfamiliar.
IV. MARKET PRESSURES FOR CONVERGENCE

Path dependence theorists have explained why there will not easily be
convergence in regulatory systems that influence capital markets and corporate
governance. However, market pressure is creating a countervailing force, particularly
for those economies seeking access to global capital markets. Convergence has been
defined as the movement towards a common understanding and endorsement of the
basic elements of effective corporate governance, including a legal framework that
protects shareholder rights.86 While the economic systems themselves may not closely
converge, there is broader acceptance of the notion that there are key principles for
effective governance that need to be adopted by nation states and their domestic
corporations if they are to expect the enhanced flow of capital investment to their
economies. Romano has observed that if domestic firms require capital, and additional
debt is not an option, the global market for equity capital may produce a convergence
in corporate law rules because outside investors will demand adequate protection of
their investment in advance of investing capital."
To date, convergence is taking the form of a movement towards market-based
models. This is not, however, a purely market-based trend. While there are public
regulatory changes to facilitate the development of securities markets in bank-centred
economies, there have not been concurrentregulatory changes to facilitate the movement
of foreign banks into the United States or other market economies. Thus, the current
arena for competition for capital will be Europe and other economies where banks have
played a significant role in governance. 8 The decisions by market economies to not
allow freer competition in terms of laws regarding banks are clearly political and
cultural choices that reflect a particular normative view of both securities and banking
regulation. The current shifts in securities markets outside of North America should
thus not be taken as pure market decisions in terms of efficient and fully competing

J. Allen, "Code Convergence in Asia: Smoke or Fire?" (2000) Corp.Govemance Int'l
at I, online: Global Corporate Governance Forum <http://www.gcgf.org/library/speeches
85

/allenAsiaCnvrg.doc> (date accessed: 28 October 2001). Allen is the Secretary General of the

Asian Corporate Governance Association (AGCA), founded in 1999 by business leaders of seven
Asian economies.
86 Millstein, supra note 22 at 4.
87 Supra note 56 at 2.
88
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capital structures. Capital markets continue to be shaped by political choices.
For emerging and transitional economies, the need for global capital has
created considerable market pressure for convergence of corporate norms. A recent
Russell 20-20 survey of investor confidence in several Latin American countries
revealed that the future flow of foreign capital into corporations in these countries is
likely to be constrained until there are both state regulatory initiatives to enhance
investor confidence and private sector initiatives to develop corporate governance
practices that more closely converge with international norms.89 These norms include
protection of foreign shareholder rights, greater financial disclosure, regulated securities
and lending markets, effective director oversight, andjudicial systems that enforce these
rights.
Thus, while regulatory change may be very slow, markets are creating some
pressure for convergence of private property protection. The market pressure for
convergence of corporate governance norms is most acute where there is risk of
expropriation of investors' capital within economic systems with poor regulatory
protection. It does not exist in the same way where there are serious concerns about
oppressive labour practices or serious environmental harm. For example, in efforts to
attract capital investment, Asian and other companies have listed on Anglo-American
stock exchanges, and in doing so have been required to conform to the more rigorous
disclosure requirements of these exchanges. In Asia, numerous states have also moved
towards transparency measures, including independentboard members and international
auditing standards, as a means of regaining investor confidence.9" Japan's 1998 Code
of Best Practices addresses board size and function and an enhanced role for
institutional shareholders. These are responses to the capital market, not to the need for
a more integrated approach to global capital and labour markets.
The pressure for convergence will not necessarily result in the unquestioning
adoption of Anglo-American governance norms. While some scholars suggest that
convergence towards Anglo-American norms will enhance Japanese capital markets,
Japanese legal scholars have suggested that the pressure for convergence is unlikely to
lead to a wholesale adoption of the Anglo-American corporate governance model.
Masafumi Nakahigashi observes that while there is a need to attract foreign capital to
Japanese markets and thus to adjust the corporate law regime to meet international
standards, there is a rigorous debate in Japan as to whether those standards should be
American standards.91 He suggests that Japanese corporate governance norms, such as
lifelong employment and enhancing employee firm-specific skills, are still highly
valued. Moreover, there is an increasing flow of American and other capital into
Japanese markets with the knowledge that these structures and norms continue to be the
operating paradigm in Japanese corporate governance. Thus, Nakahigashi suggests that

The Russell 20-20 is a non-profit group of 20 pension funds and 20 major money
management organizations, investing US $1 trillion in capital, online: Dean LeBaron
<http://www.deanlebaron.com/articles/v-afei.html> (last modified: 4 October 2001).
90 J. Allen, "Building Stronger Boards and Companies in Asia: A Concise Report on
Corporate Governance Policies and Practices" (Asian Corporate Governance Association, H.G.,
China, January 2000), online: Global Corporate Governance Forum <http://www.gcgf.org/
library.htm> (date accessed: 28 November 2001).
9 Supra note 76.
9
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the corporate governance and securities law reforms expected in the next two years are
more likely to craft governance norms that respond to global capital markets, while
continuing to promote existing norms that value workers' contributions and
collaborative decision-making structures.
There may be market convergence in another sense. While Anglo-American
scholars tend to be disparaging of the control exercised by banks in continental Europe,
there are arguably efficiency gains in the monitoring of corporate managers. The AngloAmerican corporation is facing a similar challenge in the growth of institutional investor
activism, generally recognized as a positive trend in U.S. corporate governance. Like
blockholders in bank-centred regimes, the institutional investor is an intermediary, in
terms of being entrusted with the savings or equity investments of large numbers of
people. Like banks, they have the information, resources and capacity to develop
expertise to monitor corporate activity. Thus, in both Anglo-American and continental
European regimes, concentrated investment provides both the incentives and the
capacity to monitor performance. However, what is largely absent from the AngloAmerican debate regarding institutional investor activism, is the issue of whether there
is also some future risk of these investors extracting a control premium that is ultimately
a risk to minority shareholders. While institutional investor activism is viewed as
helpful in dealing with Anglo-American agency problems, there has been inadequate
consideration of why this model is more desirable or efficient than reasonably successful
bank-centred models in central Europe. Issues ofrisk capacity, agency costs and control
premiums in this respect require further comparative study. Moreover, while
institutional investors offer enormous potential to use their economic power to press for
fundamental change in governance, to date, the activism has been aimed at more
traditional governance reform.
While there is growing recognition that certain regulatory systems must be in
place to facilitate movement of capital and provide exit mechanisms on finm failure,
there are concurrent normative pressures to dismantle other regulatory frameworks in
terms of environmental standards and social safety nets. 92 This is a deeply contested
debate among scholars and policy-makers. There is also debate as to how market
convergence will affect protections for stakeholders such as employees. Within this
debate, workers are usually viewed as fixed capital claimants, with no interest in the
corporation beyond wages and benefits owing. Thus, Anglo-American governance
theory is pre-occupied with potential rent-seeking by employees and with the
distributional effects of any governance structures that recognize and value workers as
human capital investors. In part, this is because human capital investments are not
properly accounted for in valuing inputs to corporate economic activity. Moreover,
there is a normative assumption that competitive markets can externalize third party
harms and do not need to take account of this in costing and making efficiency
determinations. These assumptions have become key to the Anglo-American
shareholder wealth maximization paradigm. Given increasing pressure to compete for
global capital, much of it coming from Anglo-American investors, there is pressure on
countries such as Germany, France and Italy to move toward the Anglo-American
model, and as such, to rethink their recognition and protection of employees and other

92 Sarra, supra note 21at 385.
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stakeholders.
It is no surprise, given the self-interest of capital investors, that market pressure
for convergence of corporate governance norms has not been accompanied by
concurrent market pressure to protect employees, small creditors or other stakeholders
in these jurisdictions. The dismantling of regulatory barriers has accompanied the
globalization of capital, product and labour markets in order to enhance the flow of
capital. With the reduction in regulatory barriers, there are legitimate concerns
regarding effects on other stakeholders.
V. THE OECD PRINCIPLES FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

As noted in Part I, the OECD Principles for corporate governance are aimed
at assisting governments in their efforts to improve the regulatory framework for
corporate governance. They are organized around four key principles: shareholder
rights and equitable treatment of shareholders; disclosure and transparency to enhance
accountability; the role of other stakeholders; and the responsibility of corporate boards.
The Principles make a compelling case for disclosure and basic shareholder rights, but
fail to adequately address some of the key questions regarding shareholder activism,
diverse shareholder interests and governance norms discussed above. While the
Principles recognize the value of other stakeholder contributions, such as creditors and
workers, and urge corporations to comply with stakeholder rights as recognized by law,
they fail to articulate the reasons why these rights should be subject only to domestic
laws while shareholder rights are paramount. The practical need to attract capital and
the strong normative paradigm of shareholder wealth maximization combine to raise
shareholder rights and remedies to universal principles of governance, without
consideration of other models.
A.

Protection of ShareholderRights and Equitable Treatment of Shareholders

The OECD Principles expressly recognize the ownership of private property
as a key means by which resources are used efficiently, and the need to protect those
property rights under differing legal and political regimes.93 They specify that basic
shareholder rights include: the right to secure methods of ownership registration and the
ability to convey or transfer shares; the right to obtain relevant corporate information on
a timely and regular basis; the right to participate and vote in general shareholder
meetings in person, by proxy, or other forms of voting in absentia; and, the right to elect
board members and share in the profits of the corporation. This includes the right to be
sufficiently informed and participate in decisions regarding fundamental corporate
changes, such as amendments to corporate charter documents, authorization of
additional shares, and extraordinary transactions. Shareholders should be given the
opportunity to ask questions and place items on the agenda at general meetings, subject
to reasonable limitations.94 La Porta et al. have found a correlation between shareholder

" Including the right to buy, sell and transfer shares, participate in profits, limit liability
and some voting and disclosure rights, ibid. at 8.
94 Ibid.
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protection and developed external capital markets.95 Mayer has observed that basic
shareholder rights are preconditions for efficient financial markets in Europe because
they encourage equity trading and the efficient running of corporations.96 The Principles
reflect these norms and practices.
The OECD Principles also suggest that markets for corporate control should
be allowed to function in a transparent manner. Rules and procedures that govern the
acquisition of corporate control in capital markets should be clearly articulated so that
investors can make informed decisions based on their rights and remedies. Shareholders
should be able to obtain information regarding voting rights attached to all classes of
shares prior to purchasing shares, and changes to voting rights should be subject to
shareholder vote. Insider trading and abusive self-dealing should be prohibited and
those prohibitions enforced because such acts involve manipulation of capital markets.
Directors and officers should be required to disclose any material interest in matters
affecting the corporation. Transactions should occur at transparent prices and under fair
conditions that protect the rights of all shareholders according to their class. Antitakeover devices should not be utilized to shield managers from accountability or to
impede the functioning of the market for corporate control.
The OECD Principles reflect norms that are self-evident in Anglo-American
systems. To date, the shareholder rights paradigm that has dominated the discourse in
Anglo-American market-based economies has not been universally applied. Part II
identified some of the problems occurring internationally with basic shareholder rights,
including regulatory failures, extraction of control premiums and limited minority
shareholder ability to influence corporate decision-making. While markets for capital
and for corporate control will create incentives for managers to improve corporate
efficiency, codifying basic shareholder rights will reduce investment risk and transaction
costs. The Principles call for equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority
and foreign shareholders. An important determinant of the degree to which shareholder
rights are protected is the existence of cost effective legal mechanisms for dispute
resolution and remedies. This is balanced with numerous devices to protect corporate
officers from excessive litigation, particularly deference to business judgments.
The Principles thus enshrine important basic shareholder rights. However, they
may fail to fully appreciate the diverse nature of shareholder interests, as discussed
above. Controlling shareholders and blockholders do not face the same kinds of issues
as minority shareholders regarding protection of their investments. The move to more
liquid capital markets presents these investors with the problem of dilution of their
equity and reduced ability to monitor managers. For widely dispersed shareholders, a
concern is basic access to information and mechanisms for exit, since they are unlikely
to have the information or resources to influence governance. Another operating
assumption is that workers and small investors are mutually exclusive categories. Yet
workers, other than those in contingent and secondary labour markets, are increasingly
small equity investors, either through employee share ownership plans (ESOPs),

11 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silane & A. Shleifer, "Corporate Ownership Around the
World" (1999) 54 J. of Fin. 471, online: National Bureau of Economic Research <http://papers.
nber.org/papers/W6625> (date accessed: 28 October 2001).
96 Supra note 47 at 3.
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individual investments, and as contributors to pension funds. Workers investing in their
own firm are more vulnerable to loss of both human capital and equity capital
investments, and have less ability to diversify their risks. Investors with sizeable
shareholdings such as institutional investors, face uncertain delineation of their rights
when considering investment in other jurisdictions. Becht points out that "enhancing
shareholder value" has different meanings depending on the context; shareholder value
in the European context means maximizing value for minority and foreign shareholders,
frequently contrary to the will of strong controlling blockholders, whereas shareholder
value in the U.S. context means accountability by strong managers to weak
shareholders.97 While these values are addressed at the margin, the Principles do not
suggest any structural changes that would better accommodate this diversity of ifiterest,
nor do they address what values are or should be key, given the range of equity investor
interest and capacity for risk and return.
While the Principles endorse limited shareholder participation, they fail to
promote a more active voice in governance, whereby investors articulate their
governance priorities and preferences. The "right to influence the corporation" is
essentially viewed as including default rights, such as participation at general
shareholder meetings, board elections and voting on fundamental transactions. The
Principles caution that, as a practical matter, corporations cannot be managed by
shareholder referendum, and that managers should be left to exercise their business
decisions without shareholder interference.98 Although the Principles recognize that
shareholders should be able to bring forward proposals, they recommend a pre-condition
of a specified number of shares and then broad discretion by managers to prevent the
proposals from being placed on the agenda. This latter restriction is aimed at preventing
frivolous shareholder proposals. However, it also makes a normative choice regarding
which kinds of shareholders will have participation rights; for example, institutional
shareholders, blockholders and controlling shareholders, many of whom already
influence corporate decision making. This in turn may have distributional
consequences. It does not allow individual investors to bring forward proposals because
they do not have the resources and information to adequately monitor or to solicit
support from across a broad range of shareholders. For corporations with blockholding
or controlling shareholders, the Principles add little to these shareholder rights, other
than transparency, and they do not address the problem of such shareholders extracting
a control premium.
Investor protection is an important public policy goal, even more so now that
technological developments allow small investors to participate over the Internet in
rapidly changing securities markets. The Principles do not really address the impact of
such change on global capital markets or the protections that may be required for these
investors. Interestingly, the Principles do recommend greater use of technology in
shareholder voting as an aid to foreign shareholders. While this recommendation would
assist with transparency, it is not reconciled with the retention of tight controls over the
scope of shareholder participation that are advocated by the Principles. Although there
are practical barriers to shareholder activism, its potential merits further study. While
managerial accountability is measured by shareholder value, the role of shareholders is

9' Supra note 27 at 12.
98 OECD, supra note 1 at 12.
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limited in the Principles. Shareholder activism is increasingly an issue in the United
States and Europe, conflicting with traditional deference to business judgment.
Shareholder proposals tend to be related to managerial performance, social and
environmental issues, and are generally an expression of choices regarding governance
of the corporation.99 For example, in Germany, there is an increase in shareholder
proposals and counter-proposals filed in opposition to management initiatives, aimed
primarily at ensuring that the corporation is a "good global citizen" in the manner in
which it accounts for environmental protection and labour standards, in addition to longterm shareholder wealth maximization.'
In the U.S., there has been considerable
growth in institutional shareholder activism, in which pensions and other funds have
intervened directly in governance.'0 ' In Canada, Labour Sponsored Investment Funds
conduct occupational health and safety, environmental and human rights audits prior to
investing, and monitor corporate decisions on these matters on an ongoing basis. These
reflect shareholder preferences, and such preferences may vary considerably given the
source of equity funds, any political or social direction given by the constituting
documents and the control structure of the institutional investor. While the Principles
address shareholder rights issues in terms of traditional governance structures and
unaccountable managers, they do not address current issues raised by investor activism.
It would have been helpful to consider the tension between the separate legal personality
of the corporation and new activism by shareholders.
The share-related rights in the Principles also do not squarely address many of
the above-cited problems in market economies, specifically, the problems faced by
minority shareholders confronted by controlling shareholders or blockholders. While
this can in part be remedied by effective corporate boards, the Principles do not address
the issue of blockholder or controlling shareholder control of board seats and board
decision making. If boards are structured in such a manner as to act in the best interests
of the corporation, and they include truly independent directors, then it is likely that the
rights of minority shareholders enshrined in the corporation's charter documents will be
somewhat protected, and that issues such as fundamental change will be brought to
shareholders for approval. Such independence would help to prevent controlling
shareholder or insider self-dealing transactions that harm the equity holdings of
shareholders.
The OECD Principles conclude that optimal capital structure is best determined
by officers and the board, and all that is required is disclosure of the structure. Yet there
continues to be considerable debate globally about the efficacy of dual class and other
voting shares, characteristic of closely-held corporations, where capital is needed but
existing equity owners wish to retain control. There are diverse kinds of shares with
different kinds of voting power, based on straight allocation of voting rights or on rights
that are activated on particular control transactions. They have enormous implications

" State of Connecticut, Office of the Treasurer, Global Proxy Voting Policies
(Connecticut: Office ofthe Treasurer, 2000) at36, online: State ofConnecticut<http://www.state.
ct.us/ottlproxvoting/2lobalvotingpolicies.PDF> (date accessed: 1 November 2001).
,01 Ibid. at 36-39.
,01See e.g. CaliforniaPublic Employees' Retirement System, online: CalPERS <htt:.//
www.calpers.ca.gov/default.htm> (date accessed: 13 November 2001).
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for the protection of equity capital investors, and distributional effects in terms of the
exercise of voting power in favour of controlling interests to the detriment of minority
shareholders. Yet the Principles miss a valuable opportunity to engage in a debate
regarding the relative merits and risks of various share structures. Similarly, the
Principles are silent on the question of pre-emptive rights, again only requiring
disclosure. With pre-emptive rights, on the issuance of new stock, existing shareholders
are given the first opportunity to purchase additional shares in proportion to the amount
of shareholdings they have. They protect existing investors, but act as a deterrent on
control change and, in particular, as a barrier to foreign investors influencing
governance. Again, the failure of the Principles to engage in a risk/benefit analysis of
such mechanisms leave them thin on shareholder rights.
Thus, the Principles advocate basic shareholder rights that largely reflect
Anglo-American governance norms. While these will facilitate access to global capital
and the development of deeper and more liquid securities markets, they are thin in their
analysis of very timely concerns about shareholder activism and rights within diverse
economic systems. They also do not fully account for more bank-centred models of
governance or hybrid models that may require a more complex understanding of
shareholder rights. As is evident in section C below, they also fail to explore the
intersection between shareholder interests and those of other stakeholders with
investments in the corporation.
B.

Disclosure and Transparencyof Financialand Non-FinancialInformation

A key issue for global capital is how to assess risk and potential return when
the corporation is operating in another country with different regulatory and cultural
norms. The disclosure problem squarely raises the issue of the extent to which
managers and controlling shareholders should be accountable to minority and foreign
investors. Transparency was historically less of a concern in closely-held corporations
because controlling shareholders monitored managers. However, with the growing
diversity of capital structures, there are new risks in terms of accountability. Thus,
disclosure is key to monitoring. The most valuable contribution made by the Principles
to the governance debate is in terms of their disclosure and transparency
recommendations.
The OECD Principles recommend that the corporate governance framework
should ensure timely and accurate disclosure on all material matters regarding the
corporation, including the financial situation and operating results, corporate objectives,
performance, ownership structure and voting rights, membership of the board, key
executives and their remuneration, governance structure and policies of the corporation.
The Principles also recommend that this disclosure include material foreseeable risk
factors, as well as material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders. This is
to facilitate investors' assessment of the stewardship of the corporation. Transparency
includes the disclosure of information such as self-interested transactions and crossshareholdings, where there is potential for conflicts of interest. Information preparation
should be undertaken by independent auditors in accordance with international
accounting standards. The Principles recommend that there be channels for fair, timely
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and cost-efficient dissemination of information. 0 2
Disclosure is a key feature of liquid capital markets, allowing corporations to
attract and retain capital, and allowing investors to influence corporate behaviour by
exit. The OECD suggests that disclosure of corporate objectives should include policies
relating to business ethics, environmental and other public policy commitments,
allowing investors to evaluate the relationship of the corporation with the communities
in which they operate. 3 Such disclosure is important to investors concerned with
"ethical investing", although it only facilitates exit, not voice. It is difficult to influence
such corporate policies solely through exit, because the market will respond to unethical
practices only if the practices seriously detract from shareholder value and only if
managers perceive that such exit is linked to shareholder dissatisfaction with particular
practices.
Disclosure and transparency requirements allow shareholders to monitor the
use oftheir equity capital, enhancing board accountabilitymechanisms. As noted above,
many shareholders do not have the resources to use the information to effectively
monitor their investments. However, institutional investors, such as pension funds, are
increasingly likely to use these transparency guarantees to monitor performance, and
then influence corporate governance by voice or exit, signalling to other investors
failures in governance. Pension funds now hold more than 25% of equity in U.S.
corporations."°4 The interests of pension funds may align with small shareholders
because they represent the interests of many individuals and thus are likely to press for
good governance. 0 5 Mutual funds and other institutional investors are likely to take
advantage ofreduced barriers to information exchange through the internet. As a result,
transparency and disclosure may be necessary to effectively compete in global capital
markets. As noted in Part III, there is already some market convergence in this respect.
Notwithstanding the valuable contribution the Principles make to the
transparency debate, there are further disclosure issues not addressed by the Principles
that need to be developed. For example, current investor education is aimed at the
prevention of fraud and enhancement of investing skills, with little or no attention to
skills that would allow investors to assess, invest or act (through exit or voice) based on
their own social and political preferences. 0 6 James Fanto argues that institutional
investors could join forces with individual investors to promote corporate morality and
agent morality. Disclosure norms and fiduciary obligations rarely address normative
issues such as treatment of employees or tort claimants, thus, education is needed so that
investors can understand the importance of business and governance norms and can
appreciate collective action possibilities.0 7 To this, I would add that investor education
is required in terms of appreciating the distributional consequences of particular

OECD, supra note I at 8.
20.
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S. Nesbitt, "Long-Term Rewards From Shareholder Activism: A Study of the
CalPERS Effect" (1994) 6 J. Applied Corp. Fin. at 75.
WS Becht, supra note 27 at 61.
106 J.A. Fanto, "Investor Education, Securities Disclosure and the Creation and
Enforcement of Corporate Governance and Firm Norms" (1998) 48 Cath. U. L. Rev. 15 at 17.
"07 Ibid. at 25.
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governance models. The Anglo-American paradigm suggests that consideration of
stakeholder interests has distributional consequences that detract from shareholder
wealth maximization. While this is true, it ignores the fact that Anglo-American
governance also makes continual distributional decisions in terms of diverse
shareholders and in terms of externalities. Investor education in this respect would
facilitate more informed investment choices and might ensure that market pressures
more accurately reflect diverse investor preference regarding governance practice.
"Exit" can send uncertain messages through imperfect markets to managers,
particularly in regard to issues of social responsibility or environmental harms resulting
from corporate actions." 8 Shareholder voting could provide shareholders with an
opportunity for a wider range of expression of preferences and ultimately make
managers more accountable. In this context, voting on social responsibility issues is
preferable to exit and may provide a more effective means of communicating investor
preferences. One possibility suggested by Dallas is development of a system of voting
rights based on the concept of constituency.0 9 Where voice instead of exit is effectively
used, the power imbalances between investors and managers would shift.
C.

The Role of Stakeholders in CorporateGovernance

The Principles suggest that the corporate governance framework should "...
recognize the rights of stakeholders as established by law and encourage active cooperation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the
sustainability of financially sound enterprises."" 0. The Principles acknowledge that
corporate governance is concerned not only with the flow of external capital to the
corporation, but also with encouraging stakeholders to "... undertake socially efficient
levels of investment in firm-specific human and physical capital."' The Principles
suggest that creditors play an important role in some governance systems, and that
employees contribute to long-term success of the corporation, acknowledging that this
role varies considerably among nations due to laws, practices and market forces.
However, the Principles do not contain any analysis as to why these interests
should only be recognized where laws require such protection. While the Principles
ostensibly recognize corporate governance systems in which workers and other
stakeholder interests are more highly valued and protected, they are assessed largely in
terms of disclosure to equity investors to enhance their ability to make investment
decisions. Stakeholders can be broadly defined as those with an interest in the
corporation, including creditors, employees, suppliers, consumers, and local
governments. Yet the Principles do not analyze the nature of governance structures that
would best enhance stakeholders' firm specific investments. Performance incentives for
employees are applauded with no concomitant rights attaching to their human capital
investments. While participatory mechanisms such as worker representation on boards,
employee stock ownership programs (ESOPs) or other profit-sharing strategies vary,
there is no endorsement of any principles except to suggest disclosure where such

10' Dallas, supra note 9 at 23.
109 Ibid. at 24.

o Supra note 1 at 18.
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stakeholders are allowed to participate. This can be contrasted with the more careful
analysis of protection of shareholder interests in the Principles.
There are highly divergent approaches to workers as investors in the
corporation. The Anglo-American paradigm has been that employees do not have
investments in the corporation greater than the wage/effort bargain, and thus corporate
decision-makers should not be accountable to them. Only more recently is there some
recognition that the nature of human capital investment may be specialized or beyond
fixed capital claims such that their interests need to be accounted for in governance of
the corporation." 2 In countries with co-determination models of corporate governance,
such as Germany, human capital contributions are recognized and valued. German
works councils situated at the production level and joint supervisory boards exercising
corporate oversight both have the stated objectives of working collectively for the good
of both the enterprise and the employees, imposing a collaborative model." 3 While
another view of this model is that employees continually engage in rent-seeking at the
supervisory board level, such that managers merely align their interests with controlling
shareholders and bypass the influence of workers on boards, there appears to be
inadequate data to support the conclusion that such rent-seeking is the operating
paradigm. Co-determination as a conceptual model thus requires further study, in order
to be able to draw on elements of collaboration that may assist in protecting the interests
of stakeholders in the governance of the corporation, and may be amenable to adapting
to change in rapidly evolving markets. The Principles fail to address this.
Similarly, the analysis of the governance role of creditors is seriously underdeveloped. As noted in Part II, there are both advantages and disadvantages to this role.
Failure to articulate principles that would encourage an effective governance role for
creditors is a major weakness in the Principles. Moreover, the governance role of
creditors is significant not only for German and Japanese governance models, but also
in the insolvency context in Anglo-American markets. When a corporation is financially
distressed, Anglo-American courts have held that corporate officers acquire a fiduciary
obligation to consider creditors' interests as residual claimants to the value of the
corporation's assets." 4 If the corporation has the potential to become viable, banks and
other senior lenders are key players in the corporate restructuring. Often they acquire
board membership or extract other governance change to allow for monitoring in
exchange for their support of the workout. The Principles fail to address these aspects
of governance in terms of the role of stakeholders, in this case, creditors of the insolvent
corporation. Given the unprecedented number of firm failures internationally in the past
decade, this was another missed opportunity to advance the governance debate.
Moreover, the Principles underplay the powerful role of financial institutions

Sarra, supra note 21 at 418-429; M.M. Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking
CorporateGovernanceForthe Twenty-First Century (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute,
1995).
.".Mitbestimmungsgesetz, 1996, 5 Commercial Laws of Europe 483-91(1982);
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz(Works Constitution Act), as am. February 2001, 87 f, 94-96 ff, 11 1ff,
Germany.
14 J. Sarra & R. Davis, Director and Officer Liability in Corporate Insolvency
(Toronto: Butterworths) [forthcoming in 2001].
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in shaping corporate governance policy in a globally integrated economy. This is
particularly the case with respect to the role of international monetary funds and
centralized financial institutions in emerging or transitional economies."' These
institutions have had a powerful influence on the debate regarding when and where state
regulatory intervention is necessary or beneficial, and where it "interferes" with the free
flow of capital. It has shaped the debate regarding protection of equity capital as a
fundamental principle, to the exclusion of consideration of other kinds of investments,
and has an enormous distributional impact on economic wealth." 6
Some scholars have observed that corporate limited liability specifies a division
of value between shareholders and other claim holders such as tort claimants,
consumers, suppliers and other creditors. Limited liability can induce agency costs
between capital and other claim holders, which in turn can induce insiders to make suboptimal investment choices regarding the welfare of all claim holders." 7 This point is
key to the stakeholder debate.
Even within the Anglo-American governance paradigm, there has been some
small recognition of stakeholder interest. In the United States, more than 25 states have
enacted "constituency statutes," which allow corporate officers to consider the interests
of non-shareholding constituencies such as workers, suppliers, and communities in
which the corporation is located. This has sparked rigorous debate among legal
scholars, based on concerns about the lack of accountability of managers and the
inefficient decision-making. While these statutes have accorded directors and officers
discretion to consider these interests, they do not accord any substantive or procedural
rights to the stakeholders that the statutes are aimed at."' Scholars have observed that
such statutes have not altered what corporate officers already do in decision making,
specifically, to consider the interests of other stakeholders when pursuing shareholder
wealth maximization."' While this may be a valid observation, it does not address the
accountability issues that arise with this discretion and the lack of enforceable rights
under such statutes. Corporate officers are left to determine what are externalities,
without according rights or remedies to those who bear the costs of these decisions.

"I J. Wolfensohn, "A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework (A
Discussion Draft)" (1999), online: World Bank <http://www.worldbank.org/cdf/cdf-text.htm>
(date accessed: 2 November 2001); World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State In
a ChangingWorld (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1997); J.E. Stiglitz,
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6 United Nations Development Program, HumanDevelopment Report (1999), online:
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The Deputy Secretary General of the OECD recently urged transitional
economies to reform their corporate governance mechanisms to create flexible labour
markets that allow corporate restructuring, arguing that such strategies should be
accompanied by a commitment to efficient social safety nets, educational opportunities,
and strategies that take into consideration employees. 2 ' The statement ignores a global
trend towards privatization and the dismantling of regulatory safeguards and social
safety nets. Neither government nor private corporate actors have done a particularly
effective job in North America of creating effective safety nets, or of recognizing the
inputs made by workers and creditors in the corporation.' Corporations have not been
required to account for externalities. As this capital moves outward, there is pressure
to adopt this "shareholder wealth maximization/disregard externalities" approach. With
the increase in global capital markets, there is increasing pressure to externalize costs
of restructuring and environmental sustainability.
Thus, another missed opportunity in the Principles is the failure to consider
optimal governance structures that would allow for fuller recognition of different
investments in the firm. There is a lack of empirical data on the contributions that
workers currently make to governance. Legal scholars frequently assume that
shareholders and employees always have competing claims, such that managers will
exploit their differences, forming alliances with one group or the other. Yet there has
been little study of how one might craft an optimal structure in which worker and
shareholder interests align.
Corporate initiatives in establishing worker participation models also present
a double-sided dilemma. On the one hand, with diverse views given a governance role,
decision-making can be enhanced and productivity gains made. However, such
problems can also act to undermine workers' investments in the firm: either by
sanctioning those workers whose skill sets do not include innovation; or because the
energy, ideas and co-operation is extracted based on a deferred compensation scheme,
and then managerial opportunism acts to expropriate the value- added in terms of layoffs
during restructuring. Equity investments by workers has the potential to reduce some
risk of harm if workers have a meaningful decision-making role, but this must include
a recasting of corporate goals so that shareholder wealth maximization is only one
objective of corporate activity. For example, in one Canadian corporation, the corporate
constituting documents contain an express direction to corporate officers to: "make as
top priority, the creation of an organization that is dedicated to economic security and
empowerment of employees and to continuing improvements in productivity and
quality."' 22 By this recasting of the definition of "in the best interests of the
corporation," corporate decision-making that simultaneously advances these objectives
(so often treated as irreconcilable in corporate decision-making) will be compatible with
the fiduciary obligations of the directors. This definition also gives express normative
direction to corporate decision-makers, articulating a clear benchmark against which to

2 S. Kondo, "Address" (First Meeting of the Latin American Corporate Governance
Roundtable, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 26-28 April 2000), online: OECD <http://www.oecd.orW/ndf/
MOOO 15000/MOO 15378.pdf> (date accessed: 2 November 2001).
"2 Sarra, supra note 21 at 386-91.
'2 Ihid. at 429.
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assess their actions.
Berle and Means, as early as 1932, raised the issue of who a corporation should
be run for, suggesting that the modem corporation should serve society as a whole, not
merely owners and managers.123 Berle argued that corporate decision makers should be
responsible for satisfying the needs ofinvestors, workers and the aggregated community.
He cautioned, however, that the emphasis on corporations existing for the sole purpose
of shareholder profit could not be abandoned until there was a "... clear and reasonably
enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone else."' 24 Dodd argued that
corporations are the backbone of the organization of economic power and that they have
corresponding public responsibilities. 25 Sixty years later, we continue to have an illdefined scheme of corporate responsibility in regard to such stakeholders.
The Principles, based on the manager/shareholder paradigm of governance,
have failed to recognize that many parties, in addition to shareholders, have an interest
in the success of a corporation. Creditors and workers have firm-specific investments
and varying degrees of claims, both fixed and residual, depending on their arrangements
with the firm and its solvency. Employees, in particular, contribute human capital to the
enterprise, as well as any additional equity capital they may have invested through share
purchase or pension plan investments. Traditional governance mechanisms provide
inadequate protection against the expropriation of these investments.
As discussed above, efficiency needs to be recast to encompass maximizing
firm efficiency having regard to diverse investments in the firm. Rather than seeking
the "most efficient" course of action, traditionally and normatively defined as
shareholder wealth, corporate decision-making ought to encompass a choice between
competing efficient decisions, having regard to competing investor interests. Thus,
efficiency can be defined in the context of corporate goals, with those goals being recast.
This would lead to a more even-handed approach to both efficiency and risk in terms of
key stakeholders in the firm. This redefinition would recognize that the starting point
of measuring efficiency is to consider what interests and investments are at stake in the
corporation, and to acknowledge that there are competing efficient decisions that value
and protect those investments.
Crucial to the redefinition of the goals of corporate governance is the
recognition that the current Anglo-American governance model ofwealth maximization
is founded on assumptions that are normative choices. Once the normative
underpinnings ofthis model are exposed, then the decision to exclude human capital and
other stakeholder investments becomes much less compelling. Governance norms could
include a requirement that directors and officers act in the best interests of the
corporation to maximize enterprise wealth, having regard to all contributors of equity
capital, debt and human capital.'26
This redefined duty would require managers to consider alternatives in
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decision-making which might enhance a broader set of interests. It would assist in the
enforcement of implicit employment contracts by making managers less vulnerable to
challenge by short-sighted shareholders. Just as trustees in a fiduciary relationship are
required to be even-handed in their decision-making regarding apportioning costs and
benefits amongst beneficiaries, so too would managers be required to be even-handed
in their decision-making with respect to diverse stakeholders as the beneficiaries of the
duty, and to consider the effects on all investors, not just equity investors. Access by
diverse stakeholders to oppression remedies and the ability to bring derivative actions
on behalf of the corporation would increase the accountability of corporate officers.
As with cases currently brought by minority shareholders, the courts only grant remedies
under these provisions where corporate officers have acted in an oppressive or unfairly
prejudicial manner, or where circumstances warrant approving a shareholder derivative
action on behalf of the corporation. Thus, the combination of enforceable rights and
judicial deference to business judgments would allow a measure of freedom in decisionmaking but protect against expropriation of equity, debt and human capital investments
or the infliction of harms that are unfairly prejudicial to those interests. The Principles
fail to address these issues, notwithstanding the existence of models among its member
states that include some of these normative choices.
The Principles also do not address the intersection of shareholder interests with
those of other investors such as workers. Investors can adopt governance strategies that
align with the interests of these stakeholders where possible. For example, the State of
Connecticut, in adopting its Global Proxy Voting Policy, has concluded that it will vote
for shareholderproposals that create good corporate citizens while enhancing long-term
shareholder value; and it is in favour of non-strategic disclosure, particularly where it
appears that the corporation has not adequately considered the impact of a particular
action on shareholders' social and environmental concerns. 27 The following factors will
be considered in determining support for a proposal: the impact on short and long term
share value; the percentage of earnings and assets affected; the reputational issues and
vulnerability to boycott; the negative impact on workers and communities; whether
government action is more appropriate; whether the company has already attempted to
address the particular issue; industry norms; and, whether the matter is more
appropriately left to the board. Thus while the threshold for support of such shareholder
proposals appears relatively high, it nevertheless indicates that there can be principles
that guide decision-making and allow for alignment of interests with other stakeholders.
While the Policy recognizes that there may be some job losses due to efficiency gains,
particularly with mergers or acquisitions, it will not support transactions that
unnecessarily eradicate employment and economically harm communities. Equally, it
will not support cross-border mergers that diminish basic labour standards.128
Recognition of such a model for corporate governance in the Anglo-American
context may be slow given the dominance of the shareholder wealth maximization
model. However, the OECD member countries already have different governance
models that potentially could encompass a duty to take into account the interests of all
investors. It is disappointing that the OECD restricted the Principles to merely
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recognizing their existence, rather than recommending the adoption of a broader duty
to investors beyond shareholder wealth maximization.
D.

Responsibilities of the Board of Directors

The OECD Principles stop short of addressing key issues such as the factors
that would require corporate boards to take into account the interests of all investors and
the existence of problems in corporate governance outside of the classic weak
owners/strong managers paradigm of Anglo-American ownership structures. Although
the Principles acknowledge that in some countries corporate boards are required to act
in the best interests of the corporation, taking into account shareholders, employees and
the public good, they fail to endorse such models or to fully explore their contribution
to effective capital markets.
Agency cost theory seeks to ensure that managers do not abuse the power they
have acquired as the result of separation of ownership and control.' 29 Agency theory
dominates the Anglo-American governance debate and is reflected in the Principles.
Corporate governance is aimed at controlling managerial abuse while minimizing agency
costs associated with this, such as monitoring and prevention. 3 Agency cost theory
relies on markets to determine board composition and to discipline managers, and the
board's role is to improve financial performance for shareholders through reduction of
agency costs. The aims are primarily the protection and promotion ofshareholder rights,
and encouragement of
reduction of information asymmetries, cost-effective monitoring,
31
better governance through the market for corporate control.'
The Principles recommend that boards should fulfil key functions such as
reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, risk policy, annual budgets and business
plans. Boards should also set performance objectives, monitor corporate and managerial
performance, oversee major capital expenditures, be engaged in the recruitment and
selection of key executives, and overall succession planning. Boards should monitor a
number of functions, including: board remuneration practices; board nomination
process; potential conflicts of interest of managers, board members and shareholders;
integrity of the corporation's accounting, financial and audit reporting systems; the
process of disclosure and communications; and effectiveness of the governance
practices. These are important reforms to boards that recognize their contribution to
effective governance. They are also reflective of the governance changes that have
occurred in Anglo-American systems in the past decade.
In a further attempt to deal with perceived agency problems, the Principles
recommend that the boards be able to exercise objective judgement on corporate affairs
independent of managers. Recognition of power imbalances between managers, inside
directors and outside directors, requires reduction of information asymmetries, time
allowed for their responsibilities, and sufficient independence of non-executive board

29 E.F. Fama &M.C. Jensen, "Separation of Ownership and Control" (1983) 26 J. L.
& Econ. 301 at 315; 0. Hart, "An Economist's View of Fiduciary Duty" (1993) 43 U.T.L.J. 299
at 303.
130 Blair, supra note 112 at 97-98; A. Belcher, "The Invention, Innovation and
Diffusion of Self-Regulation in Corporate Governance" (1996) N. Ir. L. Q. 322 at 325.
'3' Mayer, supra note 47 at 6.
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members to allow for independent judgement. This recommendation flows from
widespread acceptance ofthe notion that independent or outside directors enhance board
performance.3 2 Although there appears to be some question as to whether boards with
a majority of independent directors actually enhance corporate governance, studies have
indicated that having a moderate number of inside directors on a largely independent
board can enhance profitability and create a more optimal balance of skills, information
and knowledge.'33
However, the Principles do not offer any resolution of the "strong
blockholders, weak managers" paradigm that exists in some of the OECD countries,
discussed in Part II above. In particular, the they are silent on the subject of fiduciary
obligation of directors. Common law jurisdictions generally have well-developed
notions of fiduciary obligation by corporate directors and officers, developed to fulfil
incomplete contracts between shareholders and the corporation.' The combination of
the common law, and its subsequent codification in statutes, acts as another check on
the activities of corporate officers. In contrast, European and other civil law countries
do not have a developed notion of fiduciary obligation, in part because obligations were
already codified, and in part because of the strong monitoring influence of blockholders
and controlling shareholders. For example, in Germany, there has been little
development of the notion of fiduciary obligation toward minority shareholders. As a
result, there are few limits on the ability of controlling shareholders to act to the
detriment ofminority shareholders, and minority shareholders lack effective remedies. 3 '
Scholars have suggested that it is important to have mandatory fiduciary obligations
under corporate law. 36 Yet the Principles fail to take the opportunity to explore this
debate, or to assess the relative merits or problems associated with imposition of such
obligations.
Anglo-American theorists suggest that diverse shareholders are vulnerable to
co-determination boards because they are worker-dominated and create managerial
opportunism in bypassing the board. However, what has not really been explored is the
fact that the powerful alliance of blockholders and managers pre-dates statutorily
imposed co-determination, and that worker participation on boards was a structural
response to this alliance. The fact that there has not been a shift in the power balance
does not necessarily mean that the model could not effectively respond to concerns
regarding effective board oversight, perhaps in combination with the development of a
fiduciary responsibility of directors and officers towards shareholders and other
investors. The OECD Principles present an underdeveloped conceptualization of board
theory.
L. Lin, "The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance
Mechanism: Theories and Evidence" (1996) NW. U. L. Rev. 898 at 915.
' S. Bhagat & B. Black, "The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition
and Firm Performance" (1999) 54 Bus. Law. 921 at 922, 950.
"1 R.J. Daniels & E.J. Waitzer, "Challenges to the Citadel: A Brief Overview of Recent
Trends in Canadian Corporate Governance" (1994) 23 Can. Bus. L. J. 23 at 28.
m R. La Porta et al., "Legal Determinants of External Finance" (1997) 52 . of Fin.
1131.
136IN. Gordon, "The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law" (1989) 89 Colum. L.
Rev. 1549 at 1555.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The debate regarding optimal corporate governance principles, when applied
to the diverse economic, capital and management structures implicated in international
corporate activity, is at a nascent stage. It is accompanied by private law and capital
market pressure for convergence. However, it is far from clear that "efficiency" in
corporate governance can be achieved through an unquestioning reproduction of the
Anglo-American governance model throughout the world. There are two reasons for
this lack of clarity. First, the Anglo-American model suffers from its own problems
internally. Within the model there is no agreement on whether "efficient" shareholder
wealth maximization is short or long term, and it sanctions the creation of
"externalities", for example, costs of corporate activity imposed on those outside of the
corporation. In turn, these externalities raise a question as to why those bearing the costs
do not have their interests considered in these corporate decisions.
Second, the model and its various features were a response to highly diversified
share ownership and the correspondingly strong role played by managers in corporate
governance. Other economies have very different ownership structures, with many
corporations being controlled by alliances of strong blockholders and weak managers,
leaving minority shareholders vulnerable to other shareholders' actions. While AngloAmerican corporate governance is primarily concerned with controlling the agency costs
of having managers act on behalf of diverse shareholders, that of other countries may
be more concerned with managers acting even-handedly towards all shareholders and
not favouring the interests of strong blockholders. While the Principles refer to this
issue under the shareholder recommendations, they fail to consider governance
structures that would ensure this shift in emphasis from agency costs to even-handed
treatment.
They do highlight the debate regarding the reconciliation of diverse corporate
structures and activities with growing global capital markets. The principles of
transparency, accountability, fairness and responsibility appear to have wide application.
From the viewpoint of an observer situated in North America, many of the principles
seem to be self-evident and necessary components of a well-regulated corporate system
that encourages and enhances investment. Yet as is discussed here, while they provide
a useful starting point, there remains a considerable gap in our understanding of how
these principles would translate into the diverse governance structures that currently
exist. Equally, while the OECD has suggested that it has resisted endorsement of one
type of corporate governance structure, the Principles are remarkably close to those that
shape Anglo-American governance structures and theory. That this reflects the
dominant market economy model is no surprise. While the Principles purport to
recognize the divergence of corporate structures and diverse economies, the normative
pressure for convergence is based largely on an assumption that the convergence will
reflect the Anglo-American model as the most highly developed regulatory framework
for capital markets. At the same time, they fail to fully account for trends such as
shareholder activism.
The Principles recognize that there are both public law and private law aspects
to corporate governance. This is an important contribution to the debate and makes
more explicit a number of the operating assumptions in Anglo-American regulation of
securities and protection of equity capital investors. However, within that recognition,

2001-2002]

Convergence Versus Divergence, Global Corporate
Governance at the Crossroads

223

the Principles do not really address the inherent tension between the public and private
law aspects. For example, on the one hand, regulatory reforms are sought to facilitate
the global movement of capital by ensuring protection of equity interests, particularly
foreign capital and minority investors, in terms of recognition and enforcement of
property rights. Regulation is also sought in terms of importing international accounting
and auditing standards to enhance protection of financial institutions and other investors.
On the other hand, deregulation is sought to "free up" labour markets, to encourage free
trade and generally discourage regulation that inhibits investment. Thus, regulation is
sought to facilitate the global movement of equity capital while the same considerations
are not part of the debate for human capital investors. These inherent tensions, and the
failure of the OECD principles to address them, stem from the underlying assumptions
that the optimal approach to a globally integrated economy is to maximize efficiency by
facilitating the ability of corporations, investors and lenders to compete in global capital
markets. While there is no doubt that such competition is an essential prerequisite for
continued economic growth, it may cast the paradigm too narrowly. This is illustrated
by the definition of efficiency discussed above and the operating assumption that
efficiency is enhanced by externalizing costs whereverpossible. Thus only costs internal
to the corporation are measured in determining efficiency, primarily through the measure
of return to shareholders. Yet a model that suggests that capital, ifgiven free movement
and protection of property rights will move to the highest use, ignores a number of
market and other realities. It completely bypasses the debate regarding why property in
this context is a higher-valued commodity than human capital or other investments.
These are deeply embedded normative notions that have distributional consequences
without ever being explicitly acknowledged. Moreover, those with the resources and
interest in promotion of market economies have the resources to champion the debate.
The international debate regarding optimal corporate governance practices
seems to be leading to its own convergence of opinion that no one system of governance
is optimal, because of the diversity and complexity of ownership structures. However,
within that consensus there continues to be a divergence of opinion regarding what
action is required by private parties to enhance governance, and whether market
convergence will pre-empt policy debate on principles for corporate governance. It may
be that any convergence of corporate governance regimes should be a two-way
movement, rather than the adoption of the norms and principles of only one of the
dominant governance models.

